Capstones, 5.9.17
By Alan W. Dowd
President Donald
Trump made the right decision in responding militarily to Syrian dictator
Bashar Assad’s latest chemical-weaponsattack,
which killed dozens of civilians. Assad’s
henchmen unquestionably violated decades-old prohibitions against the use of
such weapons as well as an internationally-brokered agreement Assad signed promising
to surrender his WMD arsenal. That fact serves as a reminder that neither the
attack nor the U.S. response occurred in a vacuum. Rather, both are part of
long chain of actions and inaction.
The agreement Assad
made to give up his chemical weapons—conceived with the blessing of Vladimir
Putin’s Foreign Ministry in September 2013, after the gassing of Ghouta—was
hailed by President Barack Obama as “an important concrete step toward the goal
of moving Syria’s chemical weapons under international control so that they may
ultimately be destroyed.” He warned that “if diplomacy fails, the United States
remains prepared to act.”
Some of us had serious doubtsabout the deal, which was implemented by the Organization for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).
The intervening years have confirmed those doubts. Even before the April
attack, Assad had violated the agreement throughout the second half of the
Obama administration.
Less than two years after OPCW
began its work, proof of the deal’s utter failure was everywhere. The Washington Post, June 20, 2015:
“Barbarism with chlorine gas goes unchecked in Syria.” Voice of America, June 17, 2015: “Syrian doctors present evidence
of new chlorine gas attacks to U.S. Congress.” The Economist, May 13, 2015: “The gassing continues.” Reuters, May 8, 2015: “Weapons
inspectors find undeclared sarin and VX traces in Syria.” The New York Times, May 6, 2015: “Two years after President Bashar
al-Assad agreed to dismantle Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile, there is
mounting evidence that his government is flouting international law to drop
jerry-built chlorine bombs.”
But Obama, tragically, did nothing
in the years after Ghouta to punish Assad or call Putin to task.
It’s tragic not only because of
the death and destruction, but also because Obama had warned Assad that using
chemical weapons would be a “red line” for the United States. Thus, after the Ghouta
attack (which killed 1,400 people), Obama
explained that Assad’s use of chemical weapons posed “a serious national security threat to the United
States,” that “a failure to stand against the use of chemical weapons
would weaken prohibitions against other weapons of mass destruction,” and that
“it is in the national security interests of the United States to respond to
the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons through a targeted military strike.”
Such a strike, the president explained, would “send a clear message not only to the
Assad regime, but also to other countries that may be interested in testing
some of these international norms.”
Obama, it seemed, recognized
the importance of reinforcing the taboo against the use of chemical weapons—and
the confluence of U.S. interests and ideals in Syria.
But then he engaged in a prime-time
debate with himself and punted the problem to Congress. Make no mistake,
seeking congressional support for military action—something the much-maligned
Bush administration did before Afghanistan and Iraq—is the preferable way to go
to war. However, other precedents—Reagan in Grenada, the elder Bush in Panama,
Clinton in Kosovo, Obama himself in Libya and Iraq—underscore that congressional
authorization was not essential after Ghouta.
Obama sought a way out of this
conundrum of his own making by accepting Putin’s promise to cajole Assad into
handing over his WMDs. But entrusting an untrustworthy regime to vouch for the
disarmament of another untrustworthy regime was something like asking a serial
killer to hand over his bullets, letting him keep the gun, allowing him to
avoid prosecution and prison, and trusting one of his accomplicesto keep track of the ammo.
Fast-forward
to today. Even though Citizen Trump urged Obama after Assad’s 2013 use of
chemical weapons, “Do not attack Syria…there is no upside and tremendous
downside,” President Trump ordered a
punitive military strike against the Syrian regime because he recognized, in a striking
echo of his predecessor’s assessment of the situation, that “it is in the vital
national security interest of the United States to prevent and deter the spread
and use of deadly chemical weapons.” But the
“America First” president also conceded that he acted to defend ideals
and values: “Babies were cruelly murdered in this very barbaric attack.
No child of God should ever suffer such horror.”
For
all his flaws, Trump seems to understand that actions are the only thing that
matter when dealing with the likes of Assad. As then-Secretary of State
John Kerry said after Ghouta, “It matters if nothing is done.”
Regrettably,
because Obama did nothing after the gassing of Ghouta, many options that
existed in 2013—striking command-and-control facilities, grounding or erasing the
Syrian air force, targeting key nodes of regime power in Damascus—are off the
table today because Russian personnel and assets are spread across Syria, most
co-located with Assad’s military. Thus, the U.S. military had to pre-informits Russian counterparts of the impending missile strike. Doubtless, Russian
commanders shared the news with their Syrian friends, sparing the guilty
parties and preserving their instruments of murder. Indeed, Assad has dispersed
his air force since the punitive U.S. missile strike.
It’s
also important to note that Putin didn’t intervene in Syria until 2015. Obama’s
erased “red line” surely played a role in that decision. Whether the
U.S. should have avenged Ghouta or protected Aleppo or toppled Assad is open to
debate, but the importance of U.S. credibility is not. Obama failed to grasp
this; Putin acted accordingly.
If you subscribe to the notion
that U.S. foreign policy should be based solely on interests, it’s easy to avert your gaze from Syria’s hellscape. But as
the new president has learned, it’s much harder justifying a Pilate-like
approach for those who wrestle with the headlines and believe the civilized
world is called to defend more than narrow interests.
A version
of this essay appeared in Providence.