Capstones, 10.18.17
By Alan W. Dowd
There
can be no debate that North Korea’s nuclear-weapons tests, missile
launches into Japanese airspace and threats to attack U.S. territory are
hostile acts. What is debatable is what the U.S., Republic of Korea,
Japan and other allies in the not-so-pacific Asia Pacific region should
do about North Korea.
Korean War II
One option a surprising number of observers (here, here and here) and former and current policymakers (here, here and here)
have mentioned in recent weeks is preemptive or preventive military
action. Although the terms are often used interchangeably, there is an
important difference: Preemptive action is taken in anticipation of an
imminent threat and certain attack. Preventive action is taken to
prevent a possible attack or emerging threat. Thus, the Iraq War was
preventive not preemptive.
To be sure, these sorts of anticipatory military actions are
sometimes the least-bad option. Surely, Britain and the world would have
been better off had the British government heeded Churchill’s warning
from the back bench of Parliament in 1934—when Hitler was still
weak—that “Germany is arming fast” and proposing “preventive war to stop
Germany from breaking the Treaty of Versailles.” Israel’s 1967
preemptive war on its Arab neighbors as they circled for the kill saved
the Jewish state from destruction. Israel’s 1981 preventive strike on
Iraq’s nearly-completed nuclear facility at Osirak spared Israel, the
Middle East and the United States from a nuclear-armed Saddam Hussein;
likewise, its 2007 preventive strike on Syria’s not-yet-completed
nuclear facility at Deir el-Zor spared Israel, the Middle East and the
United States from a nuclear-armed Bashar Assad.
However, anticipatory action—whether preventive or preemptive—must be
weighed against the likely costs. And in the case of the Korean
Peninsula, the costs would outweigh the benefits.
President Bill Clinton ordered the Pentagon to develop plans for preemptive action against North Korean nuclear sites. The Air Force even conducted simulated counterproliferation strikes.
But those plans were shelved, and understandably so. As the
Congressional Research Service concluded, “The tactical success of a
counterproliferation mission could be lost in the consequences of
another war.”
Indeed, North Korea deploys 13,600 artillery pieces/rocket-launch
systems, 4,100 tanks, 730 warplanes and hundreds of missiles. In 2005,
Gen. Leon LaPorte, former commander of U.S. Forces-Korea, warned that
every third round fired from North Korea’s vast artillery fields would
be a chemical weapon. Seoul would bear the brunt of the blow. With its
10 million residents, Seoul sits just 35 miles from the DMZ—a sobering
thought given that 70 percent of the North’s military is deployed within
60 miles of the border zone. That explains why experts talk of “World
War I levels” of casualties—and why the measure of success in Korea for
U.S. presidents is simply getting through another day, another year,
another term without another war. It’s a low bar. But given what Korean
War II would look like, it’s a worthy goal.
Even a short war—even a war contained to the peninsula—would be
ferocious, brutal and bloody. Gen Rob Givens provides some of the
details here. The Pentagon has projected more than 200,000 U.S.-ROK military casualties in the first 90 days,
along with hundreds of thousands of civilian casualties. As Joint Chiefs
Chairman Gen. James Dunford observes, Korean War II would be
“horrific…a loss of life unlike any we have experienced in our
lifetimes.”
Worse, none of this takes into account the specter of nuclear weapons
being used against the ROK, Japan, the U.S. and/or North Korea.
Moreover, Korean War II would directly impact four of the world’s
largest economies representing almost 50 percent of global GDP (the
U.S., ROK, Japan and China).
Such a war would give new meaning to the term “Pyrrhic victory.”
Given the high risks, the low tolerance for casualties among the U.S.
electorate, the post-Iraq fatigue and the post-sequestration state of
the U.S. military, preventive war seems like a nonstarter. But there are
other options.
Strengthen the Alliance
While Seoul counts on its partnership with Washington, South Korea is
no longer dependent on the United States for its preservation. Nor is
it, contrary to President Donald Trump’s comments last year, free-riding on the back of the U.S. military.
Consider the division of labor: 600,000 ROK troops augmented by 28,500 U.S. troops. Consider Seoul’s increases in defense spending. Consider the ROK’s recently-unveiled “kill chain” doctrine designed to deter and, if necessary, destroy the North Korean People’s Army.
All of this underscores something the North Koreans, Chinese and even
some Americans seem to overlook: The ROK is not some appendage of
Washington. Rather, it’s a sovereign nation in the crosshairs of a
terror state. Moreover, it’s a U.S. treaty ally that has fought and bled
alongside American troops. As such, it deserves Washington’s
support—not threats to tear up trade treaties or a bill for our shared commitment to peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia.
Trump’s decision in September to allow Seoul to purchase more
advanced weaponry from the U.S.—including missiles with longer ranges
and heavier payloads—is a hopeful sign. If the North Koreans want an
arms race, the U.S. and ROK should give them one—and remind them that
the West has waged and won such struggles with far more formidable foes
than the Kim regime.
Strengthen the Shield
Pentagon officials convinced Seoul in 2016 to allow deployment of a
THAAD anti-missile system. Although ROK President Moon Jae-in delayed
deployment of THAAD in June, he reversed course in August and approved
four additional THAAD launchers. This adds yet another layer of
protection to the South, which already fields Patriot batteries and
Aegis warships. Also in 2016, South Korea joined the U.S. and Japan for
the trio’s first-ever joint missile-defense exercises.
To shield Americans, Japanese and South Koreans from North Korean
miscalculation or provocation, the allies need to train together more
often and deploy more defensive equipment—more THAAD systems, more Aegis
warships, more Aegis Ashore systems, more Patriot batteries, more
missile-tracking radars in the region and more ground-based interceptors
in the U.S.
Rebuild the Arsenal
Of course, fielding more missile-defense assets presupposes more
defense spending. Japan and South Korea have been increasing defense
spending. But the U.S. defense budget has fallen from 4.6 percent of GDP
in 2009 to 3.1 percent today. This is the best way to invite the worst
of possibilities—what Churchill called “temptations to a trial of
strength.” And here we are.
U.S. policymakers should reverse this downward spiral, restore
defense spending to the post-Cold War average of 4 percent of GDP and
recognize that a well-equipped military is not a liability to cut but an
asset to nurture. To his credit, Trump has proposed a $639-billion
defense budget for 2018—well above sequestration’s draconian limits.
Congressional leaders have proposed even larger defense budgets, some as
high as $705 billion.
Raise the Stakes
Kim Jong Un’s generals know that a second Korean War will not end in
stalemate—it will end North Korea. But does Kim know that? To make sure
he understands the stakes, Washington could publicly (after the
requisite discussions with Seoul) announce that the U.S. is redeploying
deterrent nuclear assets to South Korea. In a sign of goodwill and
confidence-building, Washington withdrew U.S. nuclear weapons from the
South in 1991. Pyongyang and Seoul then agreed to keep the Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons. Pyongyang
violated that agreement, just as it violated the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, the Agreed Framework, and scores of UN Security
Council resolutions related to missile tests and nuclear development.
Deploying a nuclear deterrent in the ROK is not a kneejerk reaction of fanatic-fringe warmongers. In fact, in 2010 and again this year,
high-ranking ROK officials raised the prospect of redeploying U.S.
nuclear assets to deter the North and provide increased force protection
for U.S.-ROK troops. Nearly 70 percent of South Koreans support the return of U.S. nuclear weapons to the ROK.
In addition to noting that “redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons
is an alternative worth a full review,” South Korean Defense Minister
Song Young-moo recently confirmed that he asked Defense Secretary James
Mattis to rotate or base “strategic assets”—aircraft carriers,
submarines, long-range bombers—in South Korea.
“We need these
strategic or tactical assets…closer to North Korea’s nuclear and missile
sites,” Chun Yung-woo, former ROK national security adviser, said in a Washington Post interview.
Play the Ace Card
Of course, Seoul could always go nuclear on its own. If Beijing
continues to allow North Korea to play these deadly games, Washington
could play the Seoul-Tokyo card.
Nearly 60 percent of South Koreans support developing their own nuclear deterrent. “We
can’t borrow an umbrella from a neighbor every time it rains,” says Won Yoo-cheol, a leading lawmaker in the National Assembly. “Only nuclear weapons could be an effective deterrence against nuclear weapons.”
Related, Japanese government officials and analysts have, at times, hinted at Japan’s capacity to develop a nuclear deterrent—and even the need to do so.
Yes, the PRC’s media mouthpiece warns, “If North Korea launches
missiles that threaten U.S. soil first and the U.S. retaliates, China
will stay neutral,” and Beijing has cut coal shipments from and fuel shipments to the North. But Beijing claims it can’t fully control Pyongyang
because North Korea is a sovereign nation. Washington should privately
remind Beijing that South Korea and Japan are as well, and suggest that
it may no longer be possible for the U.S. to keep Tokyo and Seoul from
joining the nuclear club. This may be the best way to pressure Beijing
to rein in its Frankenstein monster in Pyongyang. Mattis would be the
ideal delivery vehicle for such a message.
Worst Case
To be sure, these options—building up the military, redeploying
tactical nukes, engaging in hard-nosed nuclear deterrence, signaling
China’s leaders and Kim’s generals, strengthening missile-defense
capabilities, repositioning strategic assets—present their own risks and
costs. But they are offered as alternatives to something far worse:
waging preventive war against the North or waiting for the North to
miscalculate us into a war.