Project Fortress | 8.8.18
By Alan W. Dowd
In
mid-July, after a chaotic week of unforced errors courtesy of President Donald Trump,
Director of National Intelligence Dan
Coats calmly explained that Russia’s efforts “to
undermine our basic values,” “divide us from our allies,” and “wreak havoc with
our election process” are “undeniable,” grimly concluding: “We’re under
attack.” Noting that “the very pillar…of democracy is the ability to have
confidence in your elected officials—that they were elected legitimately,”
Coats added, “We have to take every effort to ensure that happens in this
upcoming election and future elections.”
Before discussing some of the efforts
the U.S. might take in response to Vladimir Putin’s Russia, it’s worth
recapping what Moscow has been doing.
Using cyber-technologies, social
media and false-front
organizations, Russia has carried out strategic-influence
operations targeting political-electoral systems in 27 countries, including the U.S.,
Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Lithuania, Poland and several other NATO
allies.
Freedom House reports that Russia has
“deepened its interference in elections in established democracies
through…theft and publication of the internal documents of mainstream parties
and candidates, and the aggressive dissemination of fake news and propaganda.” Kristofer
Harrison, who worked in the State Department and Defense Department under
President George W. Bush, points to examples at Bloomberg, Reuters, the New York Times and other
reputable news organizations.
Equally worrisome, Putin’s Russia has tried to influence policymakers through compromising
material, gain access to critical
infrastructure and even exacerbateracial
tensions in the U.S.
Moscow’s goal in these actions, according a U.S. intelligence
report, is to “undermine public faith in the
U.S. democratic process” and “undermine
the U.S.-led liberal democratic order.” And Moscow may be succeeding: A
plurality of Americans (45 percent)
believe Russia leaked hacked material in order to impact the 2016 election, and68
percent of Americans express concern that
Russia will interfere in future elections.
Similar
worries are emerging elsewhere in the West: “Russian hackers are targeting
Macron,” blares a France24 report. “Russia used Twitter bots and trolls ‘to
disrupt’ Brexit vote,” reads a headline from The Times of London. “Merkel warns of Russian cyberattacks in
German elections,” Deutsche Welleadds.
Add it all up, and both the evidence of Russian interference and the worry that
Russia might interfere are undermining the West’s faith in its own institutions.
In
this light, NSC-68,
the pivotal national-security document penned in 1950 that provided a roadmap
for waging the Cold War, seems strangely relevant. NSC-68 noted that Moscow’s “preferred technique is to subvert
by infiltration and intimidation,” that “every institution of our society is an
instrument which it is sought to stultify and turn against our purposes,” that
institutions “that touch most closely our material and moral strength are
obviously the prime targets,” that Moscow’s objective is to prevent those
institutions “from serving our ends and thus to make them sources of confusion
in our economy, our culture and our body politic.”
To be sure, NSC-68 was a response to the communist Soviet Union.
But it pays to recall that post-Soviet, post-communist Russia is led by a
former KGB intelligence officer trained in the dark arts of disinformation and
influence manipulation. His intelligence agencies and cyber-soldiers are
distracting our government, sowing confusion and undermining public confidence
in our institutions.
Consider that Russia’s hacking into U.S.
political campaigns, manipulation of social media and use of weaponized leaks first
eroded support for the Clinton campaign; then undermined the legitimacy of the
Trump presidency; and finally, as former CIA official Mark Kelton concludes,
helped “advance Putin’s over-arching goals of degrading American power,
denigrating American ideals, and driving a wedge between President Trump and
the U.S. intelligence community.”
Given the nature and effect of Russia’s strategic-influence
operations, it’s no wonder that policymakers on both sides of the aisle describe
Russia’s behavior as “an act of war.”
Clearly, President Barack Obama’s too little, too
late and toothless “cut it out” warningto Putin as well as Trump’s obsequious echoof Putin’s promise that “it's not Russia…I don't
see any reason why it would be” have failed to address this threat. Both leaders
have overlooked a basic truth in dealing with dictators: All that matters when
interacting with Putin and his kind are actions—theirs and ours. What
Churchill said of his Russian counterparts remains true of Putin and his
puppets. “There is nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is
nothing for which they have less respect than for weakness.”
Here are
some pathways policymakers could take to change Putin’s calculus and raise the
costs of his malign actions.
Defend
the Homefront against Foreign Intrigue
In his farewell
address, Washington warned about the “insidious
wiles of foreign influence”
and the “mischiefs of foreign intrigue,” urging his countrymen “to be constantly awake” to such dangers.
The good news amidst all the troubling news is that key
institutions—Congress, federal and state agencies, and the press—have been
awakened to the dangers posed by Russia’s strategic-influence operations. Day
by day, these institutions are exploring and exposing Russian intrusion into
the U.S. political system.
Several congressional committees are investigating Russia’s
reach, which is altogether appropriate. But to
restore and preserve the integrity of America’s institutions, Congress should
create a joint committee of seasoned members dedicated to a) monitoring,
investigating and exposing attempts by Russia and other foreign entities to
interfere in the U.S. political-electoral system; b) identifying individuals
and entities in the U.S. that collaborate with or work on behalf of hostile
governments like Russia; and c) securing necessary, sustained funding to help
state and county election agencies shield themselves from foreign intrusion.
That last point highlights the
genius of America’s decentralized election system. Its highly diffuse
nature—with the electoral process governed not by some national agency, but
rather by 50 states and 3,141
counties—makes it difficult for a foreign power
to manipulate outcomes. Even so, evidence of Russian efforts to penetratelocal election systems and acquirefirms that handle
voter-registration data are raising flags. Federal resources can help expose
these efforts and harden these targets.
Take the Fight to Russia
Even as they stand up their new committee—call it the Joint Select Committee on
Election Integrity—congressional leaders should reopen the U.S. Information
Agency, which was shut down in 1999, after decades of countering Moscow’s Cold
War propaganda. Former DNI James Clapper proposes “a USIA on steroids to fight this information
war a lot more aggressively than we’re doing right now.”
Likewise,
NATO commander Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti urges Washington to “bring the
information aspects of our national power more fully to bear on Russia.” He recommends strengthening and unleashing the
Russian Information Group (a joint effort of U.S European Command and the State
Department) and the State Department’s Global Engagement Center (a project
charged with countering foreign disinformation).
Further up the ladder, the United States could always respond in kind to
Putin’s assault on the West’s political systems. It’s not difficult to imagine
the U.S. executing a cyber-operation that turns Putin’s stage-managed elections
into a full-blown farce: returns showing Leonid Brezhnev finishing second or
Czar Nicholas II winning a few oblasts or no one at all winning. Putin would
get the message.
Shore
up the Infrastructure
Arguing that democracy “needs cultivating,” President Ronald Reagan helped
create the National Endowment for
Democracy “to foster the infrastructure of democracy.”
In a similar way, perhaps it’s time for
the world’s foremost groupings of democratic nations—the G-7, European Union,
NATO and its partners in Japan, South Korea, New Zealand and Australia—to
create a pool of resources to reinforce and rebuild the infrastructure of liberal
democracy, monitor and expose Moscow’s cyber-siege of the West, and help those countries
under information-warfare assault preserve the integrity of their democratic
institutions.
Deploy
Additional Instruments of National Power
Finally, the United States should offer moral support to democracy inside
Russia and along Russia’s periphery. “A little less détente,” as Reagan argued,
“and more encouragement to the dissenters might be worth a lot of armored
divisions.”
Toward that end, Washington should
provide a sturdy platform to human-rights activists, journalists and political
dissidents from Russia; use
high-profile settings to highlight Russia’s democracy deficit; and draw attention—relentlessly and repeatedly—to
Putin’s assaults on human rights, civil society, religious liberty and
political pluralism.
To his credit, Trump took this very tack vis-à-vis North Korea during his 2018
State of the Union address. It’s time to use the bully pulpit in the same way
against Putin. If the president is unable or unwilling to do so, leaders in
Congress and at relevant agencies must fill the vacuum, as Coatsand FBI Director Christopher Wrayrecently have.
Hard-power tools can serve as an
exclamation point to these words: More defensive
weaponry could flow to Ukraine to protect
Ukraine’s fragile democracy; rotational deployments in the Baltics and Poland could
be made permanent to reassure NATO’s easternmost members; NATO could stand up
an Allied
Command-Arctic to checkmate Putin’s next landgrab; the
U.S. could deploy its vast
oil and gas reserves, in Gen. Martin Dempsey’s words, “as an instrument of national power”
to make Russia’s oligarchs feel the consequences of Putin’s actions.
Revelations of Russian interference are troubling. But they are also clarifying.
In light of its actions, there should be no question as to whether Putin’s
Russia is a friend, no illusions that Putin can be mollified by promises of “resets” or post-election “flexibility,” no doubts about Moscow’s motives, no debate over the threat posed by a revisionist Russia.
The task ahead is to fully expose
Russia’s reach into our political system, strengthen our institutions to harden
them against another wave of foreign influence, and defend liberal democracy at
home and abroad.
A shorter version of this essay appeared in Real
Clear Defense.