Providence | 9.28.18
Alan W. Dowd
Editor’s Note: This is the third of a three-part series
exploring the UN’s inability to fulfill its mission—and the need for the
world’s liberal democracies to consider other options to defend
themselves and keep the peace. To read part one, click here; to read part two, click here.
In part two of this series, we described the West as an
ever-evolving community of shared values. Given the UN’s long record of
failure, perhaps it’s time to formalize this community and bypass the
UN’s roadblocks to legitimizing concerted international action.
“The world’s democracies should unite in an Alliance for Democracy to
strengthen the forces of liberty against the forces of oppression,”
argues Anders Fogh Rasmussen, a former NATO secretary general and former Danish prime minister.
Ivo Daalder, who was a US emissary to NATO during the Obama
administration, has similarly sketched the outlines of a formalized
democratic partnership, labeling his idea an “Alliance of Democracies” or a “Concert of Democracies.”
Robert Kagan, too, has written about the need for “a concert of
democracies” that would enable liberal democracies to “protect their
interests and defend their principles.”
The late Senator John McCain championed “a worldwide League of Democracies” to “advance our values and defend our shared interests.”
Even President Donald Trump—who’s no fan of international
institutions—has spoken of “a coalition of strong and independent
nations…to promote security, prosperity and peace for themselves and for
the world.”
This is not a new idea.
Although he is often criticized for being overly idealistic, President Woodrow Wilson realized that “a steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained
except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government
could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants.” It’s
a pity the UN’s founders didn’t heed Wilson’s insight.
Winston Churchill was a founding father of the UN, but his words of
warning about the organization—that America and Britain would need to
ensure “that it is a force for action, and not merely a frothing of
words”—suggest he had his doubts. And his lifelong commitment to action
suggests he would not allow Russian or Chinese intransigence, or the
UN’s pale-blue soup of moral relativism, to prevent responsible powers
from addressing threats to peace.
In 1992, as Yugoslavia descended and the UN dithered, President
Ronald Reagan admitted, “I did not always value international
organizations, and for good reason. They were…nothing more than debating
societies.” He hoped that would change as the Cold War melted away—and
that the post-Cold War UN could forge “an army of conscience” to prevent
the likes of Slobodan Milosevic, Saddam Hussein, Bashar al-Assad, and
Kim Jong-il from threatening their neighbors and brutalizing their
subjects. But like Churchill, Reagan had his doubts. So, he called on
democratic powers to rise to the occasion. “Just as the world’s
democracies banded together to advance the cause of freedom in the face
of totalitarianism,” he asked, “might we not now unite to impose
civilized standards of behavior on those who flout every measure of
human decency?”
Tasks
By maintaining some semblance of international order, ad hoc
partnerships of democratic powers are doing what the UN was created to
do.
The US-British-French airstrikes against Assad’s chemical weapons
infrastructure in April 2018 are a recent example of international
policing—and perhaps an indication that two of America’s closest allies
have joined the US in concluding that the UN Security Council (UNSC)
simply cannot fulfill its core mission of addressing threats to peace.
Coalitions of democratic partners police the Strait of Malacca and
Bay of Bengal (India, Japan, the US), northwest Africa (France and the
US), the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz (Australia, Britain, France,
Italy, and the US), the South and East China Seas (Australia, Britain,
France, Japan, and the US).
The Combined Maritime Forces is a partnership of 31 nations (20 of them representative democracies)
that contribute naval and air assets, basing, or personnel to operations
focused on security in the Persian Gulf, counterterrorism, and
counter-piracy.
Formed in 2003 by 11 democratic allies in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Pacific, the Proliferation Security Initiative today enfolds dozens of seafaring democratic powers that collaborate
“to stop trafficking of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery
systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state
actors”—by force if necessary.
Australia, Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, the
Netherlands, and the US formed the backbone of anti-ISIS operations in
Syria and Iraq.
The Iraq War, which ended Saddam’s repeat-offender regime, was prosecuted by a coalition of 38 nations—most of them liberal democracies—that acted without explicit UN approval.
International intervention in Kosovo, which ended Milosevic’s final
ethnic cleansing campaign, was authorized and conducted not by the UNSC,
but by a community of democratic states known as NATO.
Some will point to this list to argue there’s no need to formalize
such activity under a new international umbrella. That ignores the very
real concerns many in the West have with military intervention not
formally sanctioned by some sort of international body. As a
consequence, many of these efforts are last-ditch attempts or are
under-resourced.
Others will argue that an easier solution might be to transform NATO
into a global gendarme. But Russia’s actions in Ukraine have forced NATO
to return to its core mission of deterring Moscow and defending the
North Atlantic area.
Still others will say that formalizing a partnership of democracies
will lead to the formation of an opposing bloc of autocracies. Such a
bloc already exists. Russia and China serve as patrons and protectors of
oppressive regimes in North Korea, Iran, Syria, Sudan, Venezuela, Cuba,
and Belarus.
Action
The UN’s failure to act suggests that a body of like-minded partners
would be more effective than a come-one-come-all open house, which means
any formalized partnership of democracies would need to be an
invitation-only club. Daalder and James Lindsey of the Council on
Foreign Relations argue membership should be restricted “to countries with entrenched
democratic traditions.” Their starting point is the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Enfolding some three dozen
democracies with market economies, the OECD includes members in the
Americas, the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and the Pacific.
This partnership of democracies should not be constrained by
consensus. “The UN bureaucracy, along with others who seek a peaceful
world, worship consensus,” Robert Kaplan sighs. “But consensus can be
the handmaiden of evil.” If nothing else, the litany of UN failures
detailed in the first installment of this series—most of them sins of
omission—underscores Kaplan’s point. “No democracy requires unanimity to
act domestically, and no community of democracies…should require
unanimity to act internationally,” Henry Nau adds.
Instead of the constraints of consensus, a partnership of democracies
could authorize action by three-fifths or two-thirds vote. Different
members could then lead coalitions of the willing to carry out what the
UN calls “the maintenance of international peace and security,” with the
imprimatur of international legitimacy. In short, this partnership of
democracies would be a “force for action,” in Churchill’s words, its
members working to address threats to peace, promote liberal order, and
defend their values—values that, by definition, the world’s autocracies
do not share.
A partnership of democracies would not be without its tensions or
limitations. After all, the diplomatic train wreck at the UN before the
Iraq war was the result of friction between two liberal democracies: the
US and France. However, allowing for action without unanimity would
encourage coalition building and compromise, rather than obstruction and
mischief.
The UN could still serve as a place where all the world’s governments
are represented. UN sub-agencies such as the World Food Program,
UNICEF, UNESCO, and the World Health Organization—organizations whose
goals the big powers generally agree on—could continue their work.
Swords and Plowshares
The courtyard of the United Nations contains a sculpture titled “Let Us Beat Swords into Plowshares”—a reference to Isaiah 2,
which looks forward to a day when “nation will not take up sword against
nation, nor will they train for war anymore.” Ironically, the sculpture
was a gift from the atheist Soviet Union.
To be sure, people of faith pray for that day, but we know it will
not be hastened by UN resolutions or UN observer missions. It will not
come until Christ returns to make all things new. As the rest of that
passage from Isaiah makes clear, mankind will beat its swords into
plowshares only because “the God of Jacob…will teach us His ways, so
that we may walk in his paths… He will judge between the nations and
will settle disputes for many peoples.” Only then will mankind live in
peace.
This is not a license to fatalism. We should strive for peace. After
all, Jesus declared, “Blessed are the peacemakers.” However, we must
deal with the world as it is and fashion solutions that protect
innocents, promote justice and defend the shared values of liberal
democracy. The UN has failed to do that for more than seven decades.
Worse, it has hindered responsible powers from playing that legitimate
and necessary role. Perhaps it’s time to try something new.