LANDING ZONE | 7.15.19
BY ALAN W. DOWD
With
most media attention focused on the impact of tariffs, the threat of
war with Iran and the endless Beltway debate over the Mueller report,
we’ve heard very little about a very big change in U.S. foreign policy.
The
change comes courtesy of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who, in
effect, expanded the scope of the U.S.-Philippine mutual defense treaty
by declaring,
“As the South China Sea is part of the Pacific, any armed attack on
Philippine forces, aircraft or public vessels in the South China Sea
will trigger mutual defense obligations under Article 4 of our mutual
defense treaty.”
While
the 1951 U.S.-Philippine treaty commits both sides to respond to an
“armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or
on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on
its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific,” what has
been left ambiguous is whether the United States defines the South China
Sea as part of the Pacific Ocean. Pompeo has removed that ambiguity.
TENSIONS
It’s
unquestionably a good thing for allies and foes to know where America
stands. Indeed, America’s clarity of treaty commitments, along with its
deterrent military strength, have prevented great-power war for almost
75 years.
However,
there was a compelling reason Washington was reluctant, until now, to
expand the application of the U.S.-Philippine mutual defense treaty into
the South China Sea: the area is fraught with tensions, claims and
counter-claims. Look no further than last month’s hit-and-run ramming by Chinese vessels of a Philippine fishing boat operating in a disputed
part of the South China Sea, which Manila described as “barbaric,
uncivilized and outrageous.”
This
is just the sort of incident that could escalate into a crisis or
conflict no one wants. And it explains why then-Defense Secretary Jim
Mattis, when asked in 2018 about the U.S.-Philippines treaty and the
South China Sea, responded by saying “these matters” are “complex
issues.” But if Washington’s reluctance to expand the scope of its
defense pact with Manila was reasonable, so was Manila’s desire for U.S.
support in the South China Sea.
Beijing
is engaging in provocative behavior and making provocative claims all
across the region – encroaching on U.S. treaty allies in the Philippines
and Japan, flouting the principle of freedom of the seas, and
threatening U.S. interests.
In a bid to annex the South China Sea piecemeal, China has constructed 3,200 acres of illegal islands in international waters. (We’ll return to that word “illegal” in a
moment.) These instant islands have obvious military applications.
Beijing has deployed SAM batteries, anti-ship missiles and radar systems
on some of the islands. One of the islands features a 10,000-foot
airstrip – long enough for bomber aircraft. All told, Beijing now has 27
military outposts sprinkled across the South China Sea, many of them in
or encroaching upon waters and territories claimed by other nations.
As
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan warns, Chinese strongman Xi Jinping
seeks to turn the South and East China Seas into “Lake Beijing.”
China’s island-building campaign coincides with a military buildup. Beijing has increased military spending 164 percent since 2008. On the strength of this spending binge, China
will soon deploy 73 attack submarines, 58 frigates, 34 destroyers, five
ballistic-missile submarines and two aircraft carriers. The Pentagon
reports China deploys more than 2,800 warplanes and has a bristling
missile arsenal with “the capability to attack large ships, including
aircraft carriers, in the Western Pacific.”
Xi
offers an ominous exclamation point to these numbers: “We must insist
on using battle-ready standards in undertaking combat preparations,
constantly enhancing officers’ and troops’ thinking about serving in
battle, and leading troops into battle, and training troops for battle.”
RESPONSES
Manila has responded via diplomatic, military and legal avenues.
On
the diplomatic front, Manila has strongly and loudly pushed back
against China’s actions. “You cannot create an island,” Philippine
President Rodrigo Duterte argues.
“It’s man-made and you say that the air above this artificial island is
yours. That is wrong because those waters are what we would consider
international sea. And the right of innocent passage is guaranteed.”
Along with its enduring alliance with the United States, Manila is pursuing deeper defense partnerships with South Korea, Japan and Australia.
And like everyone in China’s neighborhood, the Philippines is beefing
up its defenses in response to China’s worrisome words and aggressive
actions. Manila is in the midst of a $40 billion defense modernization program that’s adding new fighter jets, attack helicopters, armored personnel
carriers, artillery, precision munitions, unmanned aerial systems,
patrol ships and frigates from the United States, Britain, Europe, South
Korea, Israel and Japan.
Philippine naval vessels have participated in exercises this summer in the South China Sea, alongside warships from the United
States, Brunei, India, Vietnam and Singapore. And in May, the
Philippines, the United States, Japan and India conducted joint naval
maneuvers for the first time ever -- again, in the South China Sea.
Finally,
we come to the legal dimensions of China’s actions. The Philippines
took China to the U.N. Court of Arbitration in 2013, after China seized a
reef well beyond its territorial waters. In response, the tribunal
summarily rejected China’s outlandish claims in the South China Sea – claims based on a
map created by Chinese cartographers in 1947 -- and concluded that
Beijing violated international law by damaging marine environments,
endangering Philippine vessels, interfering with Philippine fishing and
oil exploration, and trespassing into Philippine waters.
TASKS
The Philippines is not alone in challenging China’s reckless behavior.
In
2014, long before Pompeo issued his addendum to the mutual defense
treaty, the Obama administration secured Manila’s approval “to construct
facilities and rotationally position and deploy defense-related
equipment” at a number of locations in the Philippines, as The Diplomat reports. In 2015, as The New York Times adds, Washington and Manila signed a 10-year agreement allowing “the
United States to station troops, weapons and matériel at bases across
the Philippines.”
That
same year, the Obama administration ordered U.S. warships to conduct
freedom-of-navigation operations around Xi’s “Made in China” islands.
The Trump administration has continued and expanded these operations.
Not coincidentally, 2018 saw U.S. aircraft carriers make eyebrow-raising
stops in the Philippines (the first since 2014) and Vietnam (the first
since 1975).
Moreover,
after years of neglect and decline, the Navy is adding ships to the
fleet. The Navy will eclipse the 300-ship mark by next year – the first
time the Navy will have more than 300 ships in its active fleet since
2002.
This
is welcome news. After all, naval power is a prerequisite for
deterrence in the South China Sea and the wider Indo-Pacific. However,
there’s more work to do. Owing largely to sequestration, America’s navy
is not nearly large enough to deter China. At the height of the Reagan
rebuild, the Navy boasted 594 ships. Today’s Navy has only 289 deployable ships.
These numbers aren’t even close to America’s maritime needs. “For us to
meet what combatant commanders request,” according to former CNO Adm.
Jonathan Greenert, “we need a Navy of 450 ships.”
Yes,
recent defense budgets have ended sequestration’s maiming of the
military. However, a couple budget cycles are not enough to repair the
damage. “It took us years to get into this situation,” as Mattis
explained. “It will require years of stable budgets and increased
funding to get out of it.”
Given
the sheer size of America’s military, some might argue that the balance
of power in the South China Sea would still favor America -- until we
consider that America’s military assets and security commitments are
spread around the globe, while China’s are concentrated in its
neighborhood.
These
realties underscore why partnerships and alliances are so important in
meeting the challenge posed by China. The good news is that Japan, Australia,
Britain, France, India and other like-minded powers have joined the
United States and the Philippines in enforcing freedom of the seas,
freedom of navigation and rules of the road in the South China Sea.
Related, ASEAN has issued a declaration endorsing “freedom of navigation in, and over-flight above, the South China Sea.”
Washington
should put muscle behind those words and the U.N. tribunal’s decision
by organizing a multinational maritime taskforce -- perhaps under the
auspices of the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) -- to stymie Beijing’s bid to take control of the South China Sea.
Although CMF operations currently focus on security, counterterrorism
and counter-piracy in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Arabian Sea, Indian
Ocean and off the Horn of Africa, it’s not difficult to envision a CMF
taskforce dedicated to freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.
Pompeo’s
addendum to the U.S.-Philippines defense treaty is so consequential
that some observers have labeled it “the Pompeo Doctrine.”
Whatever
the label, one thing is certain: No U.S. official has ever offered such
an assurance to Manila vis-à-vis the South China Sea. Now that the
Philippines has that assurance, the United States must to be prepared
and postured to enforce it.