ASCF REPORT 3.1.20
BY ALAN W. DOWD
“Let’s stop revising history: Reagan didn’t win the Cold War.” So
declares former State Department official Marik von Rennenkampff in a
recent essay published by The Hill. Among the assertions von Rennenkampff makes to argue his case are:
>“Gorbachev was unalterably opposed to increasing military
spending; he fought a relentless campaign by the Soviet
military-industrial complex to spend exorbitant sums in response to
Reagan’s buildup.”
>There is “no evidence that Reagan’s ‘rollback’ policy—which
sought to aggressively challenge communist movements throughout the
world, from Central America to Afghanistan and Africa—had an iota of
influence on the liberalizing reforms that catalyzed the collapse of the
Soviet Union.”
>“SDI had no significant effect on Soviet strategic decision-making.”
>”Gorbachev rejected every single proposal to build a Soviet response to Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’ program.”
>There is “a deeply ideological and ahistorical narrative
that—short of war—massive defense buildups, bellicosity and tough talk
bring authoritarian regimes to their knees.”
Talk about “revising history.” One wonders how something so out of
step with reality could find its way into print. To get back on the path
to reality, let’s take a deeper look at each assertion.
>Gorbachev opposed increasing military spending.
There’s always been a mythology surrounding Soviet leader Mikhail
Gorbachev, that he was a man of peace and that his commitment to peace
is what ended the Cold War. In fact, when Gorbachev took the reins of
the Soviet Empire, he did not seek peace or plan a counterrevolution
against Lenin’s monstrous regime.
As Derek Leebaert details in “The Fifty Year Wound,” before Gorbachev unveiled his glasnost program of government openness and perestroika economic reforms, he tried uskorenie—or
“acceleration.” It included increased military spending, escalation in
Afghanistan and intimidation of restive neighbors. In 1985-86, for
instance, Gorbachev outlined a 45-percent increase in military spending
over five years. Gorbachev’s first year in power saw the Soviet nuclear arsenal grow by 1,577 warheads—even as America’s contracted. And Leebaert
reminds us that under Gorbachev the USSR’s germ-warfare program reached
its “high point of developing an arsenal of deadly pathogens.”
Moreover, this man of peace continued Moscow’s war of aggression in
Afghanistan until 1989. If it’s fair for President Nixon’s critics to
blame him for continuing Vietnam for four years—as they so often do—then
it’s fair to blame Gorbachev for prolonging Afghanistan’s agony. He had
the power to end the war, but he didn’t for four blood-soaked years.
To be sure, Gorbachev was different than his predecessors in style,
openness to change and recognition of the trends of history. He deserves
credit for that. But Gorbachev had to be persuaded to choose the path
to peace, and President Reagan did the persuading. All Gorbachev did was
make a virtue of necessity.
>Reagan’s policies had no influence on reforms that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Reagan’s foreign policy pledged American support to anti-communist
movements around the globe. This was embodied in his 1983 National
Security Decision Directive 75, which stated that a central priority of
the U.S. would be “to contain and over time reverse Soviet
expansionism.” Toward that end, Reagan unleashed a withering barrage
against the Soviet system—huge investments in defense and new weapons
systems, intelligence initiatives, technology advances, military aid,
covert operations—that fractured the very foundations of Moscow’s
empire.
Taking his cues from Reagan, CIA Director William Casey told his
deputies to “go out and kill me 10,000 Russians until they give up.”
Working with the mujahedin, the CIA did that and then some in
Afghanistan. The Soviets would lose 20,000 dead and 50,000 additional
casualties. CIA agents even helped mujahedin fighters carry out attacks
in the Soviet republic of Tajikistan. As Leebaert notes, America had not
done anything like this since the beginning of the Cold War.
Similarly, Reagan’s insistence on reversing Soviet expansionism and
supporting “Third World states that are willing to resist Soviet
pressures” exacted a heavy price on Moscow. But don’t take my word for
it. Consider what former Soviet officials say about Reagan. Peter
Schweizer’s book “Victory” quotes a number of them. According to one KGB
general, “American policy in the 1980s was a catalyst for the collapse
of the Soviet Union.” A high-ranking Communist Party official calls
Reagan’s hard line “a major factor in the demise of the Soviet system.”
Unwilling to be “confused by the facts,” revisionists like von
Rennenkampff generally respond to this view of Reagan in one of two
ways: 1) The Soviet Union, they argue, was on the verge of collapsing
with or without Reagan; and/or 2) Gorbachev would have made adjustments
on his own because of the dire economic situation facing his country.
Well, if the collapse of the USSR was inevitable and imminent, if the
Soviet Union just needed a push, why didn’t Reagan’s predecessors push?
Nixon pursued détente, accepting the permanence of the Cold War and
believing that, in Henry Kissinger’s words, the United States and Soviet
Union would forever “remain superpowers impinging globally on each
other.” President Carter’s secretary of state concluded that opposing
Soviet expansion in the Third World “would be futile.”
A Washington Post article published after a Carter-Brezhnev summit captures the sad symbolism of
Washington’s interactions with Moscow in the decade before Reagan’s
arrival. “Carter,” the Post reported, “seems to have developed a
protectiveness, almost a fondness, for the older man, especially after
he saved Brezhnev from falling on Sunday morning.”
Reagan was not about to save the Soviet state from falling. Unlike
those who saw the Cold War as a permanent condition to be managed,
Reagan challenged the American people to view it as a struggle that
could and must be won. He said so bluntly—“Here’s my strategy on the
Cold War: we win; they lose”—and eloquently—“The West will not contain
communism; it will transcend communism.”
The notion that Gorbachev would have adjusted on his own because of a
weakening Soviet economy overlooks the reality that it was Reagan who
exploited and accelerated that weakness. “Our goal is to prevent the
next round of the arms race,” Gorbachev told the Politburo in 1985. “If
we do not accomplish it, the threat to us will only grow. We will be
pulled into another round of the arms race that is beyond our
capabilities, and we will lose…the pressure on our economy will be
unbelievable.”
And that’s exactly what came to pass—because of Reagan. We will
continue to explore and defend Reagan’s record in the next issue of the
Dowd Report.