PROJECT FORTRESS, 6.8.20
BY ALAN W DOWD
The COVID19 crisis is a case study of what can go wrong when
policymakers defer governing to topic experts. Under the system the
Founders crafted, it’s not supposed to be this way.
COVID and the Constitution
Our starting point in this thorny discussion should be charity toward motives. There are Americans who view COVID19 as similar to influenza outbreaks,
criticize government responses as draconian, and believe life must go
on to preserve individual liberty. And there are Americans who view
COVID19 as more dangerous than any influenza strain, applaud government
responses as prudent, and believe life must change to preserve public
health. Both sides of this divide are populated by people of good will
and good intentions.
The well-intentioned government responses to COVID19 were largely
shaped by models produced by the Imperial College in London, which
warned that COVID19 would claim 2.2 million Americans if we went on with life as usual—what the experts call an “unmitigated”
environment. Those same models predicted that even under “the most
effective mitigation strategy examined…surge limits for both general
ward and ICU beds would be exceeded by at least eight-fold”—and 1.1
million to 1.2 million Americans would die.
Those models understandably terrified American policymakers. They also proved wildly incorrect. In fact, federal, state and local governments adopted sweeping mitigation measures. Yet the vast majority of hospitals were not overwhelmed, and America didn’t lose 1.1 million to COVID19. Instead, COVID19 will claim a projected 130,000 Americans. (And that’s employing the very expansive accounting methods used by New York, Colorado, Washington and federal officials—methods some states do not employ.) That sounds like a high death toll, until we compare it to the toll from the 2017-18 influenza season (which claimed 95,000 Americans, out of a population of 328 million), 1968 H3N2 flupandemic (which claimed 100,000 Americans, out of a population of 200 million) or 1957-58 Asian flu pandemic (which claimed 116,000 Americans, out of a population of 171 million).
Add it all up, and “the overall clinical consequences of COVID19” were
“akin to those of a severe seasonal influenza…or a pandemic influenza.”
Those aren’t my words; they’re Dr. Anthony Fauci’s.
The numbers and Fauci’s assessment force us to ponder the policy
reactions triggered by COVID19. It pays to recall there weren’t any
nationwide shelter-in-place orders, business shutdowns or school
closures in 2017, 1968 or 1957. But there were in 2020. This effort to
“flatten the curve” flattened our economy; triggered a range of
unintended consequences; and constrained the freedom of religion,
movement and association. It may be necessary for government to limit
these freedoms under extraordinary circumstances, but the bar for such
action is high, which explains why the Justice Department has warned several states, “There is no pandemic exception to the Constitution and its Bill of Rights.”
At
its core, the purpose of the economic-commercial-cultural shutdown was
to hold down the human costs of COVID19. That is a worthy and admirable
goal. But there are high costs to the shutdown itself.
A
staggering 40 million Americans lost their jobs due to the shutdown—the
largest spike in unemployment claims in U.S. history. The shutdown will
reduce economic output by $7.9 trillion over the coming decade,
according to CBO projections.
Millions of surgeries were postponed due to government orders aimed at conserving hospital resources for coronavirus cases. Studies show that a significant percentage of delayed surgeries were cancer treatments. Indeed, a team of research professors notes that half of cancer patients have missed chemotherapy treatments;
living-donor transplants are down almost 85 percent; emergency
stroke evaluations are down 40 percent; more than half of
childhood vaccinations have not been performed.
The isolation, job loss and depression triggered by the COVID19 shutdown could lead to as many as 75,000 deaths from drug abuse, alcoholism and suicide. Indeed, physicians in California report seeing a “year’s worth of suicides” in a month’s time.
The shutdown’s costs don’t end there. Domestic violence and childhood malnutrition have increased in the wake of the COVID19 shutdown. And we may never be
able to quantify the costs of a semester or perhaps a year without
classroom instruction. While we should be thankful for technologies that
allow us to work from home, we must remember that many millions of
college and K-12 students cannot learn from home—and that many millions
of Americans cannot work from home. In fact, 70 percent of us cannot work from home.
Then there are the spiritual-emotional costs of the shutdown. It is
during times of crisis that people most need the peace of visiting a
house of worship, the social supports of work, the comfort of being with
parents, grandparents and grandchildren. The shutdown stripped that
away from us. Again, digital technologies provided some of us a sense of
connection. Yet a sense of connection is not the same as real
connection. What was true in the beginning is true today: “It is not
good for man to be alone.”
Fauci and Football
Public-health experts are not to blame for these second-order
effects. They made their recommendations and offered their best advice.
Rather, our rush to listen solely to public-health experts is what
warrants blame and deep reflection. Taxpayers and elected officials,
religious groups and charities, laborers and entrepreneurs, physicians
and farmers, parents and teachers, CEOs and nonprofit leaders must learn
from this mistake and never allow it to be repeated. Shutdowns cannot
become the new-normal response to viruses.
Fr. John Jenkins, president of the University of Notre Dame, reminds us there are “questions that a scientist, speaking strictly as a
scientist, cannot answer for us. For questions about moral value—how we
ought to decide and act—science can inform our deliberations, but it
cannot provide the answer.”
Indeed, counting on experts in just one field—and entrusting the ship
of state to that set of experts—is neither wise nor effective. John
Tamny of the American Institute for Economic Research explains why. Tamny invites us to imagine Fauci attending a Washington Redskins game. Fauci leads the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease; serves on the White House Coronavirus Task Force;
pioneered the field of immunoregulation (the science of immune system
responses); has been awarded the National Medal of Science, Kober Medal
of the Association of American Physicians, and Albany Medical Center
Prize in Medicine and Biomedical Research; and holds degrees from Holy
Cross and Cornell, along with 45 honorary doctoral degrees. Fauci is
undeniably an expert in infectious disease.
“It’s not unreasonable to suggest that Fauci will be the smartest
individual at the stadium,” Tamny writes. Yet “Fauci’s mental capacity
will be very small relative to the combined intelligence of every
fan…One brilliant mind is no match for the collective wisdom of the
masses.”
The imbalance between “one brilliant mind”—or even a task force of a
dozen brilliant minds—and the collective wisdom of 330 million Americans
is even more pronounced. Yet from the White House to the statehouse,
elected officials allowed experts like Fauci to, in effect, run the
country for the better part of three months. The results were tragic—not
because the experts were incompetent or malevolent, but because their
expertise was limited.
The results would be equally tragic if we were to allow other topic
experts to re-order economic, commercial, cultural, occupational and
public-health activities in ways that suit their areas of expertise.
If
presidents and governors deferred policymaking to, say,
environmental-management agencies, there would be less pollution.
Environmental experts might be able to make every ounce of water and
every breath of air perfectly pure—but at what cost? No industrial
activity? No carbon-based energy?
If presidents deferred
policymaking to the Department of Homeland Security, there would be less
risk from terrorism and cyberattack. DHS experts might be able to make
America’s ports, borders and computer networks impenetrable—but at what
cost? The end of immigration and imports? Government control over
technology? Magnetometers at every public gathering? Checkpoints at
every intersection?
If presidents deferred policymaking to the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, there would be fewer accidents. NHTSA experts
might even be able to eliminate deaths caused by car accidents—but at
what cost? Cars built like tanks? The elimination of highways? Speed
limits lowered to 15 mph?
Each of the outcomes ensured by deferring to these topic experts is
desirable. But none is reasonable when weighed against the costs.
Make
no mistake: Presidents and governors should consider the advice of
topic experts. What they shouldn’t do is listen solely to experts from
one field. The consequences of doing that during the COVID19 pandemic
remind us why we elect politicians—not topic experts—to craft and carry
out public policy. Experts base policy recommendations on their limited
area of expertise. Politicians base policies on a vast array of
political, constitutional, economic, legal, cultural, health and
security factors. That’s the way our system of our government is
supposed to work.
Tocqueville and Truman
It’s telling that America’s constitutional order begins with Article
I’s description of the House of Representatives. The makeup of the House
is determined “by the people”—not by experts. Tocqueville wrote of the
House of Representatives, “Often there is not a distinguished man in the
whole number.” Yet the Founders determined that the House would take
the lead in all the central activities of governing—raising revenue,
building a military, declaring war, validating and settling presidential elections.
The Founders understood, as Tocqueville would later observe, that “The
intelligence and power of the people are disseminated through all the
parts of this vast country…Instead of radiating from a common point,
they cross each other in every direction.”
That observation calls to mind the life and leadership of Harry
Truman. Born and raised far from power or prestige, Truman never
completed college.
He was the very definition of a common man. Yet despite his lack of
credentials, despite the absence of letters next to his name, Truman
didn’t defer to the experts.
When Stalin blockaded West Berlin, Truman’s circle of military
experts—Defense Secretary James Forestall, Army Secretary Kenneth Royall
and Secretary of State George Marshall, the towering five-star
commander of the Army during World War II—“dismissed the idea of an
airlift” to rescue Berlin, as historian Richard Reeves writes. The Joint Chiefs suggested a face-saving withdrawal. Truman’s response: “We stay in
Berlin. Period.” Weeks later, as the airlift struggled to meet the
demands of supplying and feeding a city by air, the experts pressed
Truman again. Truman’s decision: “We’ll stay in Berlin—come what may.”
Truman was right, and his military experts were wrong. Unlike the
generals and commanders, Truman was thinking beyond a specific area of
expertise, beyond the military dimensions of the crisis, beyond the
moment. The Berlin Airlift was a hinge point in the Cold War—rescuing 2
million people from tyranny, forging an enduring alliance with West
Germany, drawing the line against communist expansion. Things would have
turned out much different had Truman deferred to the experts.