AMERICAN LEGION MAGAZINE 12.1.20
BY ALAN W. DOWD
The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed a glaring threat to U.S. public
health and national security: dependence on the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) for critical equipment, technologies, products and
medicines.
Although reliance on supply chains that originate or run through
China is not a new problem, it appears policymakers are finally serious
about addressing it. Just as the Soviet bloc’s attempt to seize West
Berlin and South Korea awakened the United States to the burdens of the
Cold War, the PRC’s criminal negligence in response to COVID-19 is
altering both the trajectory of the U.S.-Chinese relationship and the
supply chains that sustain America’s economy.
Medicines and medical supplies Prior
to COVID-19, 35.9 percent of America’s antibiotics, 49.8 percent of its
medical bandages, 71.7 percent of its textile facemasks and 77.2
percent of its plastic gloves originated in China, according to the
Congressional Research Service (CRS).
The biopharmaceutical industry
adds that pre-pandemic, China produced 70 percent of the acetaminophen
used in America and 95 percent of America’s ibuprofen imports.
It doesn’t take a Clausewitz or Kissinger to recognize that these
vulnerabilities could be exploited in a crisis. In fact, they already
have been. American Enterprise Institute scholars Daniel Blumenthal and
Nicholas Eberstadt report that China “quietly managed to buy up much of
the world’s available stockpiles of such gear as N95 masks” and
“procured nearly 2.5 billion pieces of anti-epidemic equipment” as
COVID-19 swept the globe. President Xi Jinping’s regime hoarded and then
resold the equipment at exorbitant markups – as much as 3,000 percent.
Beijing’s calculating callousness shouldn’t shock us. The PRC has
always been an ends-justify-the-means regime that has disdain for
international norms of behavior. The COVID-19 crisis proves that the
PRC’s supply-chain dominance is a weapon Xi can and will use against the
free world.
Minerals CRS reports China is a “near-monopoly producer” of rare earth elements
(REEs) and related critical minerals, including overall REEs (80 percent
of global production), yttrium (99 percent), gallium (94 percent),
magnesium metal (87 percent), tungsten (82 percent), bismuth (80
percent), arsenic (91 percent) and germanium (57 percent).
REEs are essential to the manufacture of cellphones, flat-panel
televisions, hybrid engines, computers, light bulbs, lasers, industrial
magnets, batteries, MRI equipment, fiber-optics and superconductors.
Each F-35 contains 919 pounds of REEs. In addition, REEs are used in the
M1A2 tank’s navigation system, the Tomahawk missile’s guidance system,
missile-defense technologies, satellites, night-vision equipment and
communications gear.
As with medical supplies, China has shown a willingness to weaponize
REEs. After a 2010 dispute with Japan, China reduced global exports by
72 percent and completely stopped supplying REEs to Japan. In 2020,
Beijing cut REE exports 62 percent.
This underscores why President Trump issued an executive order in
2017 directing federal agencies to develop a strategy to secure “mineral
commodities ... vital to the nation’s security.”
Military equipment and technology An interagency task force warned in 2018 that China represents “a
significant and growing risk to the supply of materials and technologies
deemed strategic and critical to U.S. national security.”
Reuters reported in 2014 that the Pentagon “repeatedly waived laws
banning Chinese-built components on U.S. weapons in order to keep the
... F-35 fighter program on track in 2012 and 2013.” Equally worrisome, a
PRC firm acquired the British company tasked with producing circuit
boards for the F-35, which will soon become the backbone of U.S. and
allied airpower.
According to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
China accounts for 73 percent of Microsoft’s inbound supplies, more than
60 percent of Dell’s and HP’s, and nearly
50 percent of IBM’s. These are among the federal government’s top information technology suppliers.
As evidence of the military’s reliance on Chinese firms for
off-the-shelf technology, the Air Force and Army purchased thousands of
items produced by Lenovo and Lexmark in 2018. Yet in 2019, the Pentagon
inspector general reported that Lenovo grafts “hidden hardware or
software used for cyberespionage” into its computers, and Lexmark has
“connections to Chinese military, nuclear and cyberespionage programs.”
Solutions If there is a silver lining here, it’s that the COVID-19 crisis has spurred the free world into reducing dependence on China.
Perhaps the most dramatic evidence of this is Britain’s 5G reversal.
After approving PRC-based Huawei for his country’s 5G buildout in
January, Prime Minister Boris Johnson reversed course
in July. COVID-19 changed neither the products offered by Huawei nor
the nature of the PRC. Rather, what COVID-19 did – or more accurately,
what Beijing’s response to COVID-19 did – was remind Britain of the true
nature of Xi’s regime.
The United States,
Britain and dozens of other countries are now building a “clean 5G
network.” Johnson is calling on the D10 – an informal partnership of 10
democracies enfolding the Group of Seven industrialized democracies plus
Australia, South Korea and India – to pool their technological
resources, build on their shared values and harness their
interoperability to create an uncompromised 5G network.
This effort points to
a practical solution to the supply-chain challenge exposed by COVID-19.
Rather than retreating into protectionism or autarky, the United States
and its allies could work together to build supply-chain resilience,
diversify supply chains, and ensure availability of critical materials,
products and technologies.
In other words, the
answer to our “Made in China” problems is not only “Made in America,”
but made also in Australia, Japan, Korea, India, Europe, Latin America
and Southeast Asia.
Toward that end, the United States is launching an Economic Prosperity Network (EPN)
comprised
of trusted partners committed to “integrity, accountability,
transparency, reciprocity, respect for rule of law, respect for property
of all kinds, respect for sovereignty of nations and respect for basic
human rights,” as the State Department reported in mid-2020. The EPN and
related efforts aim to “restructure these supply chains to prevent
something like this from ever happening again,” according to Secretary
of State Mike Pompeo. The United States, Australia, Colombia, India,
Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and Vietnam are exploring how to build
this uncompromised supply chain.
Relatedly, Japanese
and Australian officials have proposed expanding the membership and
mission of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance (enfolding the United
States, Britain, Australia, Canada and New Zealand) by adding Japan and
cooperating on production of strategically critical materials, such as
REEs and medical supplies.
Already, an
Australian REE mining firm is shipping minerals to Colorado for
processing by a U.S. firm. In a similar way, an international
partnership built around the Five Eyes, D10 or EPN could collaborate to
produce, stock and pre-position medical equipment and medicines outside
the PRC. The purpose would not be to weaponize medicine, as China has
done, but quite the opposite: to ensure that supplies are available when
needed and to allow the market to function unhindered by malign actors.
Here at home, scores of bills are percolating in Congress related to supply chains and China.
Some would
incentivize U.S. drug companies to produce more pharmaceutical
ingredients in the United States. Others would use grants or tax credits
to revive America’s REE supply chain, which withered in the 1990s.
Still others aim to bolster America’s industrial base and refashion its
technology supply chains.
Sens. John Cornyn,
R-Texas, and Mark Warner, D-Va., for instance, have introduced
legislation that would create a $750 million fund to support an
international microelectronics consortium committed to “development of
secure microelectronics and secure microelectronics supply chains.”
Their bill would also earmark billions of dollars to support fabrication
of semiconductors, promote research and prototyping of advance
semiconductors, and restore their manufacturing to U.S. soil.
There’s growing
support for “reshoring” – the process by which U.S. firms would shift
operations from China back to America. Already, the U.S. International
Development Finance Corporation and the Pentagon are distributing $100
million to reshore “domestic industrial-based capabilities to support
the national COVID-19 response.” Some policymakers want to expand on
this by creating a $25 billion “reshoring fund.”
Japan is even further
down the reshoring road. After weathering the human and economic costs
of overreliance on China in COVID-19’s wake, Tokyo committed $2.2
billion to help Japanese companies move production out of China, and 87
have already begun moving.
Larry Kudlow,
director of the National Economic Council, suggests that Washington
follow Tokyo’s model and “pay the moving costs of American companies” to
relocate factories outside China.
Costs However,
that won’t address other costs. The main reason companies move offshore
is the cost of labor, which is lower in China than in America.
Subsidizing firms to pull out of China won’t alter this economic
reality.
Then there’s
equipment. “China may not allow a company to take any of the machinery,
tools and molds in its manufacturing plants to another country,” points
out Ed Yardeni, a global-investment strategist.
These factors serve
as a reminder that breaking China’s supply-chain dominance won’t be
easy, painless or cheap. Quite unlike postwar Japan and postwar Germany,
the PRC has no desire to join an international system premised on the
rule of law, free markets and fair play – only to supplant it. And quite
unlike the Soviet Union, which literally walled itself off from the
world, China has stretched its tendrils deep into the Americas, Europe
and Indo-Pacific. As Pompeo noted during a speech in Europe, “The CCP
(Chinese Communist Party) is already enmeshed in our economies, in our
politics, in our societies in ways the Soviet Union never was.”
Indeed, Oxford Economics reports that U.S.-China trade supports 2.6 million American jobs. China’s
market accounts for 66 percent of Qualcomm’s revenue, 17 percent of
Apple’s and 14 percent of Boeing’s. A 2017 study found that trade with
China saves the typical American household $850 a year.
Even so, there
appears to be a new bipartisan interest in removing roadblocks to
reshoring. Trump has signed executive orders aimed at “relocating
medical supply chains back home” and “accelerating the domestic
manufacturing of essential medicines.” Likewise, during his presidential
campaign, former Vice President Joe Biden vowed to “use the full power
of the
federal government to rebuild U.S. domestic manufacturing capacity of our supply chains for critical products.”
The market may be a
step ahead of the policymakers. As Beijing hoarded medical supplies,
Apple and Honeywell, Fanatics and Ford, GM and GE, MyPillow and 3M,
ExxonMobil and Anheuser-Busch retooled production lines to churn out
facemasks, N95 respirators, rubbing alcohol, hand sanitizers,
disinfectants, face shields, ventilators and hospital gowns.
Producing 13 million facemasks a day, Taiwan also stepped up to fill the gap created by Beijing’s attempt to parlay a health crisis into a geopolitical windfall.
By February, firms of
every kind were moving supply chains away from China to develop
resilience. A Bank of America survey found in March that companies
operating in 83 percent of international industries – including
carmakers, semiconductor manufacturers and medical suppliers – planned
to move all or part of their supply chains out of China.
“These movements are tectonic,” according to Bank of America economist Ethan Harris.
Limits Even
free-traders like Kudlow recognize that certain industries and products
cannot be entrusted to malign actors. In fact, the father of free
trade, Adam Smith, argued in “The Wealth of Nations” (1776) that “when
some particular sort of industry is necessary for the defense of the
country,” it’s appropriate “to lay some burden upon foreign for the
encouragement of domestic industry.”
The father of our
country would agree. “A free people ought not only to be armed, but
disciplined,” President George Washington counseled. “Their safety and
interest require that they should promote such manufactories as tend to
render them independent on others for
essential, particularly for military, supplies.”
In the 21st century,
as COVID-19 has taught us, supplies that are essential for defense of
the country include not only munitions, but also minerals, microchips,
masks and medicines. After decades of close collaboration, our Five
Eyes, Group of Seven and D10 allies have proven their ability to build
up those supplies – and rebuild our supply chains.