ASCF REPORT 3.8.21
BY ALAN W DOWD
“Can the United States win a war with China?”
Scores of publications are asking some
version of this
question.
But given what a U.S.-China war would unleash, a far better question is
this: Can the United States deter Xi Jinping’s regime and prevent a war
with the People’s Republic of China (PRC)?
Ugly and Intense
Our starting
point is something too many Americans forget or never learned: Waging
war is far more costly than building and maintaining a military capable
of deterring war.
In the eight years before entering World War I, the United States
devoted an average of 0.7 percent of GDP to defense. During the war, the
U.S. spent an average of 16.1 percent of GDP on defense—and sacrificed
116,516 dead to turn back the Central Powers.In the decade before
entering World War II, the United States spent an average of 1.1 percent
of GDP on defense. During the war, the U.S. spent an average of 27
percent of GDP on defense—and sacrificed 405,399 lives defeating the
Axis.During the Cold War, by contrast, Washington spent an average of 7
percent of GDP on defense. Those investments didn’t end all wars, but
they did deter the Soviets and prevent World War III.Yet by 2000—nine
years after the collapse of the USSR—defense spending would fall to just
3 percent of GDP. Then came 9/11, and defense spending spiked above 4.5
percent of GDP. But then came the Great Recession of 2008 and the
bipartisan gamble known as sequestration, and defense spending cratered
again to around 3 percent of GDP. Is it a coincidence that just as
sequestration took a guillotine to America’s deterrent military
strength, China began annexing the South China Sea, and Russia lunged
into Ukraine and Syria? (At $740 billion,
the U.S. defense budget for FY2021 is around 3.5 percent of GDP,
although that’s a deceptively high share of GDP because of the economic
effects of the government-ordered COVID-19 lockdown.)
The destructiveness and vastness of modern war—especially hostilities
between two great powers such as the U.S. and the PRC—counsel against
crossing our fingers and hoping for the best. Unlike the wars America
has fought since 1945, a U.S.-PRC war would not be confined to some
faraway desert or jungle. Nor would it be fought solely on America’s
terms. Instead, Beijing would exploit its capabilities to inflict heavy
damage on America’s Navy, dare U.S. air assets to venture into the teeth
of its layered air-defense kill zones, deploy precision missilery
across vast stretches of Indo-Pacific waters, saturate island bases with
waves of missile strikes, carry out attacks against U.S. space and
cyberspace assets (thus blinding our forces and putting at risk our
economy), cut off critical supplies, target infrastructure and sow chaos
inside the U.S., and perhaps even threaten use of nuclear weapons.
The fact that the U.S. would be doing these very same things to the
PRC is of little comfort given the level of death and destruction the
two would unleash. Consider that a U.S.-PRC conflict would likely draw
in Japan, Australia, Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines and India—directly
impacting some of the world’s largest economies and staggering the
global economy.
“It would be very ugly,” as Lt. Col. Dakota Wood (USMC, RET) said in a Military Times analysis exploring a U.S.-PRC conflict. Added Gen. Herbert “Hawk” Carlisle (former commander of Air Combat Command) during that same symposium:
“It’s going to be rapid, it’s going to be intense, it’s going to be a
high potential for casualties.”
Factors
All of that explains why America’s military must retool and
refocus on deterring the PRC, even as America’s diplomats must refine
their messaging to prevent miscalculations in Beijing. In order for
military deterrence and diplomatic messaging to work, a few factors must
hold.
First, the adversary must be rational, which means it can grasp and
fear consequences. As Churchill observed, “The deterrent does not cover
the case of lunatics.” The good news here is that—even though its
political system and objectives, like the Soviet Union’s, are at odds
with ours—the PRC is not ruled by some death-wish dictator or by
mass-murderers masquerading as holy men. Unlike the latter, Xi and the
Chinese Communist Party are rational, recognize that they have
everything to lose, and don’t view martyrdom as a doorway to a better
world. In fact, as good atheist-communists, they probably believe this
material world is all that matters. And unlike the former, Xi’s regime
and the Chinese Communist Party want to survive and reap the rewards of
their spadework. What Churchill said of the Soviets is just as true for
Xi and his henchmen: “I do not believe that Soviet Russia desires war.
What they desire is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of
their power and doctrines.”
Second, military signals and diplomatic messages must be
understandable and understood by the adversary. Critics of deterrence
often cite World War I to argue that arms races trigger wars. But if it
were that simple, then a) there wouldn’t have been a World War II, since
the Allies allowed their arsenals to atrophy after 1918, and b) there
would have been a World War III, since Washington and Moscow engaged in
an unprecedented arms race. The reality is that misunderstanding and
miscalculation lit the fuse of World War I. The antidote is clarity plus
strength. In other words, just as Washington made clear to Moscow
during the Cold War by word and action that an attack on West Berlin or
South Korea would be viewed as an attack on the U.S.—and would thus
trigger war—Washington must convince Beijing today by word and action
that an attack on Taiwan, or the island possessions of Japan and the
Philippines, or Australian vessels will be viewed as an attack on the
U.S.—and will thus trigger war.
Third, the consequences of military confrontation must be credible
and tangible, which was the case during most of the first Cold War. Not
only did America construct a vast military arsenal to deter and contain
the Soviet Union; American leaders were clear about their treaty
commitments and about the consequences of any threat to those
commitments.
The Trump administration reversed years of defense cuts and began the
arduous effort of trying to ensure that the above factors apply to the
PRC. The Biden administration is continuing along the same path: Biden’s
defense team is firming up basing agreements with the Philippines. Secretary of State Tony Blinken just held talks with his counterparts from Japan, Australia and India—the so-called Quad partners—focused on countering Beijing. He recently declared, “The commitment to Taiwan is something that we hold to very strongly.” The State Department has pledged “deepening our ties with democratic Taiwan,” reaffirmed the Taiwan Relations Act and Six Assurances,
committed to “maintaining a sufficient self-defense capability” for
Taiwan, and declared a “rock solid” “commitment to Taiwan.” Defense
Secretary Lloyd Austin has used that same language, calling U.S. support for Taiwan “rock solid.”
In addition, freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea, which were a constant feature of the Trump
administration’s defense policy, are continuing under the Biden
administration. In its first 35 days in office, the Biden administration
sent warships through the Taiwan Strait on two separate occasions, steamed two aircraft carrier strike groups into the South China Sea for joint maneuvers, and deployed a package of B-52 bombers to Guam for “strategic deterrence operations.” Related, a U.S. B-1B bomber deployed to India in early February—the first time a U.S. bomber has
landed in India since 1945. Washington’s message to Beijing: You will
not be allowed to cordon off international waterways or airspace, and
you are exposed to multiple avenues of attack.Finally, President Joe Biden has stood up a Pentagon task force to “chart a strong path forward on China-related matters,” “meet the
China challenge,” and “ensure the American people win the competition of
the future.”
This is a good start. But additional steps are necessary to keep Xi’s
military at bay—and keep Cold War 2.0 from turning hot. We will discuss
those steps in the next issue.