PROVIDENCE 9.17.21
BY ALAN W. DOWD
The Obama and Trump presidencies re-exposed two old threads in
American politics—the twin notions that America is either too good for
the world or can do no good in the world. Even though their starting
points are different, both of those threads are part of the tapestry of
isolationism.
Early on, President Joe Biden’s rhetoric promised a rejection of
isolationism and a return to engagement. Indeed, before the collapse of
Kabul, Biden was fond of saying, “America is back”— back as the linchpin
of NATO, back at the center of the world stage, back as a dependable
ally and partner.
In his inaugural address, Biden assured the world, “We will be a strong and trusted partner for peace, progress, and security.”
Biden’s secretary of State declared, “The commitment to Taiwan is something that we hold to very strongly.” His secretary of Defense called US support for Taiwan “rock solid.”
Biden unveiled plans for a Summit of Democracy to “rally the nations of the world to defend democracy globally” and “push back authoritarianism’s advance.” He reminded the American people that “for 70 years, the United States, under
Democratic and Republican presidents, played a leading role in writing
the rules, forging the agreements, and animating the institutions that
guide relations among nations, and advance collective security and
prosperity.” If America fails to play that role, he warned, “Either
someone else will take the United States’ place, but not in a way that
advances our interests and values, or no one will, and chaos will
ensue.”
Those are powerful words. But actions always speak louder than words. And Biden’s actions in Afghanistan speak volumes.
Self-Inflicted Wounds
As with President Barack Obama in Iraq, as with President Donald Trump in Syria and Afghanistan, Biden ignored the military’s advice and instead forged ahead with an unconditional withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Regardless of one’s view of America’s Afghanistan project, the badly
botched pullout serves as a grim reminder that means are as important
ends. American troops, American credibility, American allies, and
uncounted Afghan innocents paid the price. The Biden-Trump pullout made a
mockery of what was once known as Operation Enduring Freedom and then Operation Freedom’s Sentinel and then Operation Resolute Support:
America’s support proved less than resolute. Without it, Afghanistan’s
hard-fought freedom would not and could not endure. And freedom’s
sentinel has been dimmed by the Kabul debacle. We can talk about the
swift collapse of the Afghan military, but as Gen. H.R. McMaster
explained and warned before the Taliban swept back into power, “The
Afghan military was designed to have a very strong plug-in of US
firepower… Without that, they’re in trouble.”
NATO allies were not consulted so much as they were notified that Biden was moving forward with Trump’s withdrawal plans. It pays to
recall that NATO invoked its all-for-one collective defense clause—and
went into Afghanistan—because America was attacked on 9/11. More than
1,140 allied troops were killed. And as Afghan operations came to a
close this year—20 years after al-Qaeda’s attacks on America’s largest city and America’s military headquarters—74 percent of the foreign troops deployed in the country that spawned 9/11 were not American.
This explains why some worry that the US withdrawal—thoughtlessly negotiated by Trump and
thoughtlessly executed by Biden—has done serious damage to NATO’s unity
and credibility. “It is the biggest debacle that NATO has suffered since
its founding,” concludes Armin Laschet, who is primed to succeed Angela Merkel as chancellor of Germany.
The fact that Biden rejected strong pleas from America’s closest allies, led by Britain, to extend
the humanitarian airlift beyond the arbitrary self-imposed deadline of
August 31 serves only to exacerbate the self-inflicted wound. Biden’s
refusal to budge and work with Britain led some in Parliament to
declare, “The special relationship is very, very damaged.” One MP
concluded, grimly, “Biden’s America seems to have chosen to back off
just when it was obvious only they could step up.”
Rather than showing the world that “America is back,” Biden’s actions
suggest that America is continuing to drift backward—backward to the
post-Vietnam malaise years, or worse, the isolationist interwar years.
His promise to “rally the nations of the world to defend democracy” and
“push back authoritarianism’s advance” rings hollow after Kabul. After
all, Afghanistan was a constitutional democracy, yet it was
left to fend for itself, as Biden ordered democracy’s greatest defender
to pull out in the dead of night.
What message does that send to democratic Taiwan, democratic India,
democratic Ukraine, democratic Georgia, democratic Israel, democratic Iraq, and their authoritarian foes in Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran?
The world has some unpleasant answers to that question. “The
immediate message from Biden’s Afghanistan disaster is that US allies
cannot count on America when the chips are down,” warns Indo-Pacific security expert Brahma Chellaney from his perch in New
Delhi. “The damage to America’s reputation and credibility could
potentially herald a paradigm shift in international geopolitics.”
China’s state-run media mouthpiece declares that Washington’s “desperate withdrawal plan shows the unreliability of US commitments.”
Iran’s president cheers the “military defeat” of America. His proxies in Hezbollah, with their 130,000 rockets and missiles, exult: “Let all the allies of America watch the fate of all those who put their faith in it.”
Stepping Back
Make no mistake: the Obama-Trump-Biden era of retrenchment reflects
the national mood. A world-weary America wanted to disengage from the
world, and three successive presidents have obliged.
In 2013, Pew polling revealed that 52 percent of Americans wanted the
United States to “mind its own business internationally and let other
countries get along the best they can on their own”—up from 30 percent
in 2002 and 20 percent in 1964. In 2015, 58 percent of Americans said
the United States “should not take the leading role… in trying to solve
international problems.” In 2003, 66 percent of Americans supported plans to expand the peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan beyond Kabul. But by mid-2021 69 percent of American voters supported pulling out of Afghanistan completely. We
are left to conclude that just as Pearl Harbor shattered the pre-World
War II consensus supporting US isolation, the “wars of 9/11” shattered the post-World War II consensus supporting US engagement.
Without question, engagement carries costs. The Cold War, for
instance, cost Americans 104,000 military personnel and $6 trillion. The
War on Terror has claimed 6,900 American personnel and devoured $2
trillion. Understandably burdened by those costs, the men who’ve lived
in the White House since 2009 lament America’s “endless,” “forever,” “open-ended”
military operations in Southwest Asia. But they seem to forget that US
combat forces have been deployed in Germany since 1944, Japan since
1945, South Korea since 1950, Kuwait since 1991, Kosovo since 1999. The
common denominator of this diverse group is that each is peaceful and
stable.
US troops deployed to Afghanistan in October 2001 and withdrew in
August 2021. Their presence and sacrifice did not make Afghanistan as
peaceful or stable as those other countries, but Afghanistan was
undeniably more peaceful and more stable when American troops were there
than it was before they arrived—or after they departed.
That leads us to the benefits of engagement, which we take for
granted: rescuing civilization during World War II; refashioning Japan
and Germany into liberal democracies after World War II; preserving free
governments and free markets during the Cold War; transforming Europe
from an incubator of war into a partnership of peace and prosperity;
preventing another 9/11; building a bridge back to civilization for
Iraqis and Afghans. And we somehow forget about the costs of
disengagement: Nanking, Pearl Harbor, and Auschwitz in the 1930s and
1940s; Korea in 1950; post-Soviet Afghanistan in the early 1990s, which gave rise to the Taliban, which provided safe
haven to al-Qaeda, which maimed Manhattan; Iraq in 2011, which served
as feedstock for ISIS. Doubtless, post-democratic Afghanistan, as it
spawns new threats and new terrors, will soon be re-added to this list.
The underlying premise of the American public’s standoff approach to
the world seems to be that US engagement causes more problems than it
solves. In fact, US engagement is part of the solution to the problem of
the world’s brokenness. The natural order of the world is not orderly.
As the Providencedeclaration on faith and foreign policy explains, “most of the daily craft of
foreign and defense policy involves the regular management and
implementation of policies to preserve order… those of us who live in a
powerful country have special stewardship responsibilities.” That
translates into deterring aggression where possible, punishing and
reversing aggression when necessary, and keeping the enemies of order
(jihadists, cyber-soldiers, terrorists) and freedom (communists,
fascists, business-suit autocracies) at bay. If America fails to play
that role, to quote again from Biden’s words of warning, “Either someone
else will take the United States’ place” (see China) “or no one will,
and chaos will ensue” (see Kabul).
Right and Wrong
Remaining engaged in this broken world doesn’t mean trying to make
the world “safe for democracy.” It means standing by existing
democracies. Allowing Afghanistan, which held seven elections between 2001 and 2020, to fend for itself demoralized and doomed Afghanistan’s democracy.
It means having the resources to ensure that America’s democracy can
deter the world’s autocracies. Sequestration reduced those resources,
and Washington’s COVID19 stay-at-home relief programs threaten to
consume them.
It means maintaining hard-earned gains by keeping our commitments. Pulling out of Iraq in 2011, erasing “red lines” in Syria in 2014, and quitting Afghanistan in 2021 jeopardized those gains.
It means leading the alliance system we built. Breaking our word to Poland and Czechoslovakia in 2009, trying to “lead from behind” in 2011, withdrawing deterrent assets from Europe in 2013, and calling into question security guarantees to NATO in 2017 represent the very opposite of leadership.
And it means understanding, as an American statesman warned in 2002, that “like it or not, our leadership role must include
soldiers on the ground,” that “history will judge us harshly if we allow
the hope of a liberated Afghanistan to evaporate because we failed to
stay the course,” that “we should not shrink back from our unavoidable
responsibility to bear the burden of international leadership,” and that
“America’s engagement around the world is a long-term investment in our
security.”
Senator Biden was right in 2002. President Biden was terribly wrong in 2021.