The American Legion Magazine | 8.1.13
By Alan W. Dowd
“It is an irreversible process,” an unnamed U.S.
official sighed to The New York Times in late 1991, after the Philippines ordered U.S. military forces to leave the
strategic archipelago nation. “The bottom line is that we are gone.”[i]
Not exactly. Two decades after the U.S. departed from the
Philippines, common interests and common threats have brought Manila and
Washington back together—and opened a new chapter in their fitful relationship.
Deeds
China’s behavior is a major factor in the tectonic shift
from the early 1990s, when the Philippines sent the U.S. packing. At the time,
with the Cold War thawed, Manila saw little need for the U.S. security
umbrella; Washington recognized the diminishing returns of force-projection bases
in inhospitable countries; and most observers saw China as a benign economic
power.
Beijing’s
behavior has changed that perception.
Ignoring Deng Xiaoping’s advice that China “disguise its
ambition and hide its claws,” recent Chinese leaders speak in blustery,
bruising language.
In early 2012, for instance, Hu Jintao, then-president of China,
called on the Chinese navy to “make extended preparations for military combat.”
Against whom or what, he didn’t say.
His successor, Xi Jinping, recently declared, “We
must insist on using battle-ready standards in undertaking combat preparations,
constantly enhancing officers’ and troops’ thinking about serving in battle,
and leading troops into battle and training troops for battle. And we must
insist on rigorous military training based on the needs of actual combat.”[ii]
Given Beijing’s skyrocketing military budget, this doesn’t
seem to be empty rhetoric. On a percentage basis, the growth in military-related
spending by China is unparalleled: from $20 billion annually in 2002 to an estimated $180 billion annually a decade
later.[iii]
The payoff: According to the
Pentagon’s latest report on China’s military power, Beijing now deploys 79
principal surface combatants and 50 submarines. Beijing is investing in an
array of “anti-access and area-denial weapons,” including bombers, submarines
and sea-skimming missiles capable of attacking ships from 1,500 km away,
“particularly aircraft carriers in the western Pacific Ocean.”[iv]
In short, Beijing’s burgeoning air-sea-missile
force is designed to dissuade the U.S. from coming to the aid of allies and
partners like the Philippines.
To be sure, Beijing’s military budget is a fraction of Washington’s.
Of course, as Washington invests less in defense and Beijing invests more, that
fraction is getting bigger by the year. Moreover, the United States plays a
global role as first responder and last line of defense—China does not—and America’s
military assets are spread around the globe. China’s are concentrated in its
neighborhood.
Speaking of China’s
neighborhood, Beijing has made outlandish claims in the South China Sea, an area that holds some 200
billion barrels of oil.[v] How outlandish? By international convention, a
country’s territorial waters extend 12 miles from its coastline. Beyond that,
nations observe an exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which extends 200
miles off a country’s coastline and allows for exploration rights. Not only
does Beijing expect others to observe its EEZ as sovereign Chinese
territory—which it is not—not only does Beijing refuse to respect the EEZs of
its neighbors—just ask the Philippines, Vietnam and Japan—Beijing claims waters and islands 500 miles from the
Chinese mainland. Its justification: a map created by Chinese cartographers in
1947.[vi]
Based on that map, Beijing has
claimed territories within 50 miles of the Philippines,fired on fishing boats in Philippine waters,
and recently earmarked $1.6 billion to build ports
and airfields on islands long claimed by the Philippines.[vii]In fact, The Washington Times reports
that China
has eight military bases on reefs claimed by the Philippines.[viii]
“The intrusions are getting more aggressive,” says Albert
del Rosario, the Philippines secretary of foreign affairs.
Adds Prime Minister Shinzo
Abe of Japan: “The South China Sea seems set to become a ‘Lake Beijing.’”[ix]
Dividends
The worrisome
rise of China, however, is only one piece of the shifting security
environment in the Philippines’ dangerous neighborhood.
Given the sometimes-difficult history between the U.S. and
the Philippines, Manila was not eager to rush back into Washington’s arms when
Beijing began flexing its muscles. But after 9/11, which exposed a global
terrorist network stretching from the Horn of Africa to Afghanistan to
Mindanao, the United States showed that it was interested in building a more balanced
partnership with the Philippines.
Working together, U.S. and Philippine forces have crippled
terrorist groups linked to al Qaeda and revived regions once written off as
terrorist safe havens.[x]This partnership-oriented approach not only paid dividends in the fight against
jihadist groups; it also paved the way for cooperation on security challenges
that were obscured by the smoke and fog of 9/11—challenges like China.
With Beijing bullying its maritime neighbors, then-Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton declared in 2010 that “The United States has a
national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime
commons and respect for international law in the South China Sea”[xi]—a
clear signal that the U.S. would not tolerate Chinese attempts to dominate
international waterways or annex disputed territories.
But words seldom
deter aggressors, which underscores the importance of efforts by the United
States, the Philippines and other partners to revitalize regional alliances and
defenses.
In 2012, Manila offered facilities at Subic Bay and Clark
Airbase as servicing hubs for U.S. aircraft and warships.[xii]Reuters reports that more than 70 U.S. warships stopped off at Subic in 2012.
Clark Airbase hosts more than 100 U.S. military planes each month.Washington is quietly working with Manila
to secure access to other facilities in the Philippines, including bases in the
northwest, which would position U.S. assets much closer to China.[xiii]In
addition, some observers conclude that a new seaport under construction by the
Philippines in the Spratly Islands will become a jumping-off point for U.S. air,
naval and counter-terrorism assets.[xiv]
Even as Washington takes tentative
steps back toward Subic and Clark, the Philippines is scrambling to rebuild its
woefully under-equipped military. (Investing less than 1 percent of GDP on
defense, the Philippines ranks 136thin
the world.[xv]) President Benigno Aquino pledges to spend $1.8
billion over the next four years to beef up Manila’s military—a significant
amount given that Manila’s annual defense outlays are just $2.9 billion. Manila
increased defense spending by a jaw-dropping 81 percent in 2011.[xvi]
Yet
these new defense outlays cannot cover up the Philippines’ deficiencies. Consider
the state of the Philippine Air Force, which retired the last of its
fighter jets—antique F-5s—in 2005.[xvii]
Diamonds
The
United States and other Pacific partners are helping Manila rebuild.
Washington has sent helicopters, cutters and land-based radars
to enable Manila to monitor its western waters. The two allies are conducting
large-scale military exercises. A 2013 exercise, for instance, featured 8,000
troops, dozens of warplanes and
three warships. Joint maneuvers in 2012 included 6,000 troops and featured
mock coastal invasions, perhaps foreshadowing operations to retake an island. Not
coincidentally, Manila has deployed 800 additional troops to the Spratly Islands.
“It is better to defend than retake islands,” a Philippine general shrewdly
observes.[xviii]
Published reports indicate that
Manila and Washington expect hundreds of Marines to rotate through the
Philippines annually. “We would like the
Americans to come more often,” del Rosario says, a refreshing change from the
“Yankee go home” rhetoric of 1991. Washington needs to take Manila up on
the offer—and needs to do more to strengthen Philippine defenses. The Obama
administration pledged just $30 million in military aid to Manila last year. Yemen,
by comparison, receives $100 million in
military aid annually.
In a
similar vein, Egypt’s not-so-friendly government just received a shipment of
U.S. F-16s. It’s worth noting that Manila also has requested F-16s from Washington.
“We have the capacity to buy
brand-new, but not from America,” Aquino recently announced, underscoring how
serious he is about fielding an air force capable at least of putting up a
fight. Del Rosario calls it a “minimum credible
defense posture.”
Abe,
the Japanese prime minister, envisions “a strategy whereby Australia, India,
Japan and the U.S. state of Hawaii form a diamond to safeguard the maritime
commons”—and wants to deploy “Japan’s capabilities in this security diamond.”
The Philippines sits inside Abe’s security diamond. Not coincidentally, Tokyo
is providing the Philippines with 12 new cutters
and recently signed a long-term military cooperation agreement with Manila,
enfolding exchanges of personnel
and technology.Manila is also open to Japanese troops deploying to the Philippines.[xix]
Related,
the Philippines is expected to join the Cope North military exercises. Cope
North currently includes the U.S., Japan and Australia.[xx]
Finally, there may be more help on
the way. Just before he left his Pentagon post, then-Defense Secretary Leon Panetta
hinted at NATO “helping to strengthen security institutions in Asia.” Likewise,
Abe wants “Britain and France to stage a
comeback in terms of participating in strengthening Asia’s security.”[xxi]
Deterrence
History weighs heavy on the
U.S.-Philippines relationship. Consider the
poignant story of Adm. Robert J. Kelly, who happened to be commander of the
Pacific Fleet when the United States completed its withdrawal from the
Philippines in late 1992. During the handover ceremony, as The Los Angeles Times reported, “His deep voice cracked when he
said his father will stay behind; he is buried with 17,200 other World War II
dead in a U.S. military cemetery near Manila.”[xxii]
Beyond the
decades of shared sacrifice, history also reminds us that emerging powers like
China must be handled with care.
Like today’s
China, the Germany of the late 1800s was a rising and restless power.
Washington was deeply concerned about Germany encroaching upon U.S. interests
in the Pacific and the Americas. In fact, one of Washington’s motivations in
moving against the Spanish empire’s possessions in the Philippines was to block
German expansion. “We could not
turn them over to France or Germany—our commercial rivals in the Orient,” President William McKinley argued.[xxiii]
Washington’s concerns
were validated by Kaiser Wilhelm II’s provocative deployment of a fleet to
Manila after Adm. Dewey’s victory over the Spanish. Germany’s attempted
blockade of Venezuela a few years later almost drew the United States into a
war. These incidents help explain why President Theodore Roosevelt, as
historian Edmund Morris writes, considered the Kaiser “the most
dangerous man in the world”[xxiv]—and why TR made
sure his dealings with Germany were reinforced by a big stick: the U.S. Navy.
That episode reminds
us of the importance of deterrence. Deterrence worked with Imperial Germany; it
worked with the Soviet Union; and it can work to keep the peace with China—and
keep the Philippines secure. A 2008 Pentagon report noted that China has
“deep respect for U.S. military power.” But with the United States in the midst
of massive military retrenchment, one wonders how long that reservoir of
respect will last.
By definition, sea power is an essential element of
America’s deterrent strength in the Pacific. Regrettably, Washington is
allowing U.S. sea power to atrophy.
At the height of the Reagan buildup, for example, the U.S. fleet
boasted 594 ships. When Washington dispatched two carrier battle groups to smother
Beijing’s temper tantrum in the Taiwan Strait in 1995-96, the fleet totaled 375
ships.[xxv]Today’s fleet numbers just 285 ships. The number of large surface combatants
will soon ebb from 85 ships to 78; the “build time” of new aircraft carriers is
growing from five to seven years; and the Navy recently had to request a
special congressional waiver to deploy just 10 carriers (rather than the
legally-mandated 11) while the Fordis being built.[xxvi]Worse, Vice Adm. Tom Copeman, commander of Naval Surface Forces, suggests that
the ships in the surface fleet “don’t have enough people, don’t have enough
training, don’t have enough parts, and don’t have enough time to get ready to
deploy.”[xxvii]
Does that sound like a credible
deterrent? Only Xi Jinping and his generals
can answer that question. If they don’t believe they would pay a high price for
seizing Philippine territories or turning the South China Sea into “Lake
Beijing,” then deterrence has failed. And we have opened the door to what Churchill
called “temptations to a trial of strength.”
That’s precisely what we don’t
want.
[i] DAVID E. SANGER, "Philippines Orders U.S. to
Leave Strategic Navy Base at Subic Bay," New York Times, December 28,
1991.
[ii] EDWARD WONG, "China’s Communist Party Chief Acts
to Bolster Military," New York Times, December 14, 2012.
[iii] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to
Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of
China, 2012, p.6.
[iv] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to
Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of
China, 2012, p.22.
[v]http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/01/us-southchinasea-china-idUSBRE8701LM20120801.
[vi]http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13748349.
[vii]http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-25/china-to-invest-1-6-billion-on-disputed-islands-herald-reports.html.
[viii]Bill Gertz, "Inside the Ring: Blunt
warning on China," The Washington Times Wednesday, February 6, 2013.
[ix]http://www.project-syndicate.org/print/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-india-by-shinzo-abe.
[x] State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2007,
April 2008; State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2008, April 2009; http://www.stripes.com/news/us-troops-see-terrorism-threat-diminish-on-philippine-island-of-mindanao-1.191126.
[xi]http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/145095.htm.
[xii]http://www.defensenews.com/article/20121008/DEFREG03/310080006/Philippines-Sees-Naval-Port-Vital-U-S-Presence-Pacific; http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/operations/231257-philippines-re-opens-military-bases-to-us-forces-.
[xiii] Reuters, “The US military pivot to Asia: when bases
are not bases,” November 14, 2012.
[xiv]http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/army/219717-reports-us-philippines-building-new-naval-base-in-spratlys-.
[xv] CIA, World Factbook, www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2034rank.html.
[xvi] Jane’s Defense, Defense Budget Philippines, March 12,
2012; http://www.janes.com/products/janes/defence-security-report.aspx?id=1065969869.
[xvii]http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120516/DEFREG03/305160002/Philippines-May-Buy-Fighter-Jets-Other-Than-U-S-F-16s.
[xviii] AFP, “Philippines sends more troops to guard disputed
islands,” October 2, 2012.
[xix]http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130627/DEFREG03/306270011/Philippines-Wants-Give-US-Japan-Access-Bases
[xx]http://militarytimes.com/news/2013/02/ap-jets-roar-as-us-japan-australia-drill-in-pacific-020713/
[xxi]http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-india-by-shinzo-abe#IKvhbB2AUD7MZR7d.99; http://www.asianewsnet.net/news-30876.html; http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/06/us-helps-philippines-improve-military; http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120516/DEFREG03/305160002/Philippines-May-Buy-Fighter-Jets-Other-Than-U-S-F-16s
[xxii] BOB DROGIN, "Americans Bid Farewell to Last
Philippine Base," Los Angeles Times, November 25, 1992.
[xxiii]http://www.theodore-roosevelt.com/images/presidentpics/venezuelacrisis.pdf
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/War
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/spanam/events/misc-pi.htm
http://www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/1898/chronology.html
[xxiv]http://www.theodore-roosevelt.com/images/presidentpics/venezuelacrisis.pdf.
[xxv]http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/org9-4.htm#1993
[xxvi]http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120328/DEFREG02/303280010/Fleet-Size-Hovers-Around-300-Ships-New-U-S-Navy-Plan; http://www.navytimes.com/news/2012/01/ap-navy-enterprise-leon-panetta-says-us-keeping-11-carriers-012212/.
[xxvii]http://defense.aol.com/2013/01/15/navy-cant-stay-ready-must-shrink-says-head-of-surface-forces/.