ASCF Report | 11.9.15
By Alan W. Dowd
Commentators have devoted lots of print and pixels to
comparing President Barack Obama to other presidents. Those with charitable
views have compared him to Eisenhower,Reaganand FDR;
those with critical assessments compare him to Carterand Hoover.
But on foreign policy, let’s judge the president not by comparing him to his
predecessors, but by placing his record against his own measuring rod. In 2008,
as he cruised toward winning the presidency, Obama delivered a trio of speeches—one
in Berlin,
one in Washington,
D.C., one in North
Carolina—that laid out his foreign-policy vision. Eight years later, the
chasm between the record and the rhetoric is too great to ignore.
Iraq
Let’s start with
the centerpiece of Obama’s foreign-policy platform—indeed the very fuel
for his White House run: Iraq.
In 2008, Candidate Obama said
he was committed to “ending the war in Iraq responsibly.” He criticized
policymaking in Washington before the Iraq War, when “ideology overrode
pragmatism” and politicians “spent too little time reading the intelligence
reports, and too much time reading public opinion.” He called for the creation
of “a counter-terrorism force to strike al Qaeda if it forms a base that the
Iraqis cannot destroy.” And he
declared, “true success will take place when we leave Iraq to a government that
is taking responsibility for its future—a government that prevents sectarian
conflict, and ensures that the al Qaeda threat which has been beaten back by
our troops does not reemerge.”
If only he had heeded his own counsel. By every
metric, post-surge Iraq was in better shape than pre-surge Iraq, and the
consensus among military commanders and intelligence officials was that Iraq
needed the U.S. military’s support to sustain the upward trajectory of the
surge. Most observers thought Washington and Baghdad would hammer out a new
status of forces of agreement (SOFA) to authorize a modest-sized residual U.S.
presence in Iraq. As Frederick Kagan, one of the architects of the surge, explained,
“Painstaking staff work in Iraq led Gen. Lloyd Austin to recommend trying to
keep more than 20,000 troops in Iraq after the end of 2011.” But Obama showed
little interest in securing a new SOFA and offered a residual force of just
3,000 troops. When Baghdad balked, as Kagan reported at the time, “The White
House then dropped the matter entirely and decided instead to withdraw all U.S.
troops from Iraq…despite the fact that no military commander supported the
notion that such a course of action could secure U.S. interests.”
Talk
about ignoring intelligence reports and “reading
public opinion.” There would be no
“counter-terrorism force to strike al Qaeda,” no JSOCpresence, no airbases, no
intelligence fusion centers. Iraq would be on its own. As former Defense
Secretary Leon Panetta laments in his memoir Worthy Fights, the Obama White House
was “so eager to rid itself of Iraq that it was willing to withdraw rather than
lock in arrangements that would preserve our influence and interests.”
The consequences of withdrawal were predictable: Without the
steadying hand of the American military, the Maliki government abused its
power; sectarian tensions exploded; the window of opportunity for Iranian
mischief widened; al Qaeda in Iraq reconstituted and rebranded itself as ISIS; Yazidis, Shiites and Christians were massacred;
and ISIS declared a jihadist caliphate in
the heart of the Middle East. It didn’t have to be this way.
Terrorism
In 2008,
Candidate Obama noted that “the Taliban
controls parts of Afghanistan. Al Qaeda has an expanding base in Pakistan.” He described Afghanistan as “a war that we have to win…The Afghan people must know
that our commitment to their future is enduring.” Candidate Obama was committed
to “finishing the fight against al Qaeda and the Taliban.”
Yet when U.S. ground commanders requested 40,000-50,000
troops for the Afghanistan surge, the president tortuously declared, “It is in
our vital national interest to send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to
Afghanistan,” before vowing—in the very same breath—“after
18 months, our troops will begin to come home.”
Of course, vital national interests don’t have expiration
dates, and letting the Taliban know when the U.S. military would end its
offensive made victory impossible to achieve. But according to former Defense Secretary Robert Gates, victory was
not Obama’s goal. “For him,” as Gates wrote in his memoir, “it’s all about getting out.”
The killing of Osama bin Laden in 2011 cleared a pathway to
the exit. Obama began talking about “the tide of war…receding,” reported that
“core al Qaeda” was “on the path to defeat,” concluded that it
was time “to turn the page on more than a decade in which so much of our
foreign policy was focused on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq” and ordered a complete withdrawal of U.S. stabilization forces from Afghanistan. He
even compared a little-known al Qaeda offshoot operating in
Iraq to a “JV team” in
“Lakers uniforms.” That group is
well-known today: ISIS.
It was revealed
last month that U.S. air and ground forces launched an operationagainst two massive al
Qaeda bases in the Afghan province of Kandahar. One of the bases covered
30 square miles. More than 200 commandos were involved in the operation, backed
by 63 airstrikes. Gen. Wilson Shoffner called it “one of the largest joint
ground-assault operations we have ever conducted in Afghanistan.” As for the
Taliban, it controls
more of Afghanistan today than at any time since 2001, which explains Obama’s recent decision to
reverse course and maintain a sizeable U.S. military presence in the war-torn
country through the end of his administration.So much for “finishing the
fight against al Qaeda and the Taliban.”
Simply put, Obama misread the
takedown of bin Laden as a strategic victory rather a tactical success. Consider:
·
There are 41 jihadist
groups in 24 countries today—up from 21 in 18
countries in 2004.
·
Director of National Intelligence James Clapper
called 2014 “the most lethal year for global terrorism in the 45 years such
data has been compiled.”
·
ISIS has
affiliates in Afghanistan,
Libya, Egypt and Nigeria,controls some 30,000 square miles of Iraq and Syria, fields an army of 40,000
fighters, has a steady stream of oil revenue and reigns over a
population of some 2 million people.In short,
ISIS is something al Qaeda never was: a bona fide terror state in the very heart
of the Middle East.
Iran
In 2008, Candidate Obama declared, “We cannot tolerate nuclear weapons in the
hands of nations that support terror…Ultimately the measure of any effort is
whether it leads to a change in Iranian behavior…We will present a clear choice. If you
abandon your nuclear program, support for terror and threats to Israel, there
will be meaningful incentives. If you refuse, then we will ratchet up the
pressure.”
Given that measuring rod, the summer of 2015 marked a wholesale
capitulation by Obama on the Iranian nuclear issue.
First, the
president’s nuclear deal essentially allows Iran to remain a threshold
nuclear power forever. As former Obama advisor Dennis Ross explains, “The
Iranians are not required to dismantle their enrichment infrastructure, are
allowed to continue at least limited research and development on their five
advanced models of centrifuges, and will be permitted to build as large an
industrial nuclear program as they want after year 15.”
Adds Sen. Bob Menendez: “We have gone from preventing Iran
having a nuclear ability to managing it.” This is a dramatic departure
for U.S. foreign policy. As Henry Kissinger and George Shultz have pointed
out, “For 20 years, three presidents of both major parties proclaimed that
an Iranian nuclear weapon was contrary to American and global interests—and
that they were prepared to use force to prevent it. Yet negotiations that began
12 years ago as an international effort to prevent an Iranian capability to
develop a nuclear arsenal are ending with an agreement that concedes this very
capability.”
Second, the Islamic Republic of Iran remains today what it was before the deal—and
what it has been since 1979: a revolutionary terrorist organization
masquerading as a government. Tehran continues to support Hezbollah and Hamas,
prop up a fellow terror regime in Syria, bankroll insurgencies in Bahrain,
Yemen and Saudi Arabia, deploy and test missiles, and wage proxy war against
the United States. There has been no “change in
Iranian behavior.”
Third, far from ceasing
threats to Israel, Tehran has been emboldened by the nuclear deal. After the deal was unveiled, Iranian dictator Ali
Khamenei declaredthat Israel will cease to exist within 25 years. During the negotiations, he
proposed a nine-step planto “eliminate”
Israel. Nothing in the deal required him to renounce such statements.
Allies
In 2008, Candidate Obama committed to “rebuilding our alliances to meet the common
challenges of the 21st century,” adding that “America is strongest when we act
alongside strong partners.” Some of us took issue with his premise. After all, America’s
alliances with Britain, France, Poland, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Japan, South
Korea, Australia, the Philippines and other key partners were strong when
President George W. Bush left office. So the term “rebuilding” may have been a
rhetorical reach. Moreover, media mantras notwithstanding, the Bush
administration did act alongside partners: The
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan was created in
2001; by 2007, 39 nations were contributing troops to ISAF. Thirty-seven
nations contributed 150,000 troops to Operation Iraqi Freedom. They made real contributions to the mission: The
allies represented 21 percent of the ground forces in the Iraqi theater,
sustained 1,952 wounded and lost 322 troops.
Even so, strengthening bonds with nations that share our
interests and/or ideals is always a good thing, so there was nothing wrong with
Obama’s desire to pursue that goal. Regrettably, Obama has left in his wake a
badly fractured system of alliances, and his successor will need to rebuild the
confidence and trust of old friends.
“Leading from behind” is the termcoined by one of Obama’s aides to describe his approach to America’s allies.
What the White House has learned since floating this unfortunate phrase is that
no one likes a backseat driver.
For example, when NATO intervened in Libya, the allies
expected help from the United States. What they got was Obama’s insistence that
America would play only a “supporting role” and a stunning
declaration at one point during the operation that access to U.S. air power
“expires on Monday.”
When France asked for air support
for counterterrorism operations in Mali,
Washington sent Paris an invoice.
When the Obama
administration offloaded a handful of Guantanamo detainees onto the British
colony of Bermuda, Washington failed to consult Britain. “This is not the kind
of behavior one expects from an ally,” a British official declared.
When the Obama administration pulled
the plug on missile-defense plans for Europe—plans unanimously approved by
NATO—it did so “without even informing the Polish prime minister in a timely
manner,” as historian George Weigel recalls. A
Polish defense official called the decision “catastrophic.”
Obama’s
erased red lines in Syria, nuclear deal with
Iran and zigzagging reaction to the Arab
Spring revolution in
Egypt left the Saudis deeply estranged from Washington. Israeli officials
say relations with Washington are the worst they have been in three decades.
“Our allies feel abandoned,” reportsGen. Michael Flynn, who recently retired as director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency. “There is a significant loss of trust in the U.S.
government.”
Global Engagement
“America cannot turn inward,” Candidate Obama intoned in 2008. Yet that’s
exactly what has happened under President Obama.
When the Iranian regime crushed its opponents
after the farcical 2009 election, President Obama responded to the “Twitter
Revolution” by averting his gaze. The
reaction was so bad that the protestors actually chanted,
“Obama, Obama, are you with them or with us?” The sad irony is that the
president’s ambivalence answered his own rhetorical question of
a year earlier: “Will we stand for the human rights of…the blogger in Iran?” he
asked in 2008.
When the Arab Spring slammed into Egypt, the president
initially supported Hosni Mubarak (America’s longtime autocratic ally), then
supported Mohamed Morsi
(Egypt’s first democratic president), then supported a military coup that
ousted Morsi. When Bashar Assad used
chemical weapons, the president ignored his own red lines and left military
partners in France and Saudi Arabia out on a limb. When Iraq began to
throb with violence, the president said it was time
to “focus on nation-buildinghere at home.” When
Ukraine asked for weapons to defend itself, the president sent MREs. When
pressed to do more—whether in the South China Sea or Syria or cyberspace—the
president and his staff defended his stand-off foreign policy by repeating
the phrase “Don’t do stupid stuff.”
This shift away from engagement
was predictable. Like a pendulum, U.S. foreign policy swung back from the
hyperactivity of the immediate post-9/11 era. But has the pendulum swung too
far in the opposite direction? With China
claiming control over international airspace and seaspace, bin Laden’s heirs
setting the Middle East on fire, Russia annexing sovereign nations and filling
a vacuum in the Middle East, America’s European allies begging
for help, and rogue states acting with impunity
(North Korea, Iran, Syria), even members of the president’s team know the
answer is yes.
Seemingly using the media to signal his boss, Secretary of
State John Kerry warns, “We cannot allow a hangover from the excessive
interventionism of the last decade to lead now to an excess of isolationism.”
Former Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton concludes, “Great nations need organizing principles, and ‘Don’t do
stupid stuff’ is not an organizing principle.”
Noting that “inaction” carries “profound risks and costs for
our national security,” former CIA Director David Petraeus calls Syria “a
geopolitical Chernobyl.”
Concerned about the toll of
sequestration, which was initiated by the Obama administration, former Defense Secretary
Chuck Hagel warns, “America must continue to ensure its ability to project
power…If this capability is eroded or lost, we will see a world far more
dangerous and unstable.”
Resources and Reach
In 2008, Candidate Obama declared, “It is time to reduce the
strain on our troops by completing the effort to increase our ground forces by
65,000 soldiers and 27,000 Marines.”
Yet under President Obama, Marine
Corps endstrength will fall to 182,000 (down from 202,000). The Army’s
active-duty endstrength has been slashed from a post-9/11 high of 570,000
soldiers, to 490,000 today, to 450,000
by 2018. And in what AEI’s Mackenzie
Eaglen calls “a historic shift,” there are now more DOD civilians and
contractors (1.474 million) than active-duty personnel (1.36 million).
Equally worrisome, America’s Armed Forces are facing a
morale crisis unlike any since the post-Vietnam era. A sobering surveyof active-duty troops conducted by Military Times reveals “a force adrift,”
with America’s defenders reeling from deep cuts and feeling “underpaid,
under-equipped and under-appreciated”: 44 percent say pay is good/excellent,
down from 87 percent 2009; 45 percent say health care is good/excellent, down
from 78 percent in 2009; 27 percent say the senior military leadership has
their best interests at heart, down from 53 percent in 2009.
With the defense budget cratering
from 4.7 percent of GDP in 2009, to 3.2 percent today, to 2.8 percent by
2018, the military will have fewer resources—and the United States a shorter reach—long after the Obama administration.